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ABSTRACT
In 2013, state legislators sitting at the heart of America’s opiate
epidemic created the crime of fetal assault. Although they offered a
fairly standard series of criminologic rationales to justify the
legislation, they also posited that the creation of this crime was a
precondition to secure treatment (or care) resources for women
addicted to opiates. This extraordinary supposition—that criminaliz-
ing conduct creates a road to care—is an outgrowth of three inter-
linked socio-legal trends: the building of the carceral state, the
criminalization of poverty, and the rapid growth, since the late
1980s, of a new generation of problem-solving courts. Framed in this
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historical context, this legislative rationale seems less extraordinary
and more a predictable outgrowth of these disturbing trends. As
such, the legislative rationale also provides a unique window into
what actually happens to those who are the target of this form of
criminalized care and a basis from which to evaluate the wisdom of
these trends.
An empirical study of the fetal assault law reveals two phenom-
ena—what this Article terms prosecuting poverty and criminalizing
care. The fetal assault legislation prosecutes poverty in the sense that
this form of punitive care was reserved almost exclusively for low-
income women. Although addiction crosses class, this form of “care”
is targeted at the poor. And when legislation criminalizes care, it
distorts any real meaning of care. The criminal court case files reveal
that, for the forty-one low-income women who are the focus of this
Article, any notion that care was central to their prosecutions was
either entirely illusory or profoundly debased. In the healthcare
system, there was no confidentiality. Every prosecution in the study
relied heavily on information obtained by healthcare providers and
provided to police and prosecutors in order to establish the elements
of the crime. For the majority of women in the criminal system, there
is no evidence in their court files that they were even offered or
received care. Instead, the case files document what so many poor,
low-level offenders face: jail, bail, fines, probation, and the ever-
present threat of more punishment. For the few women whose files
indicate that care was offered, that care came at a high punitive
price. Failure to comply with treatment came at a still higher price.
Ultimately, this story suggests, and this Article argues, that we must
turn away from these historical trends. Rather than continuing to
prosecute poverty and criminalize care, we must reconceptualize the
problem far more broadly and turn to programs that heal both
families and communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Sullivan County is the second oldest county in Tennessee.1 It is
nestled in the mountains and is the home of several small, once-
thriving industrial cities.2 It is also at the center of the Appalachian
opiate epidemic.3 When you talk to people in Sullivan County about
opiates, talk quickly turns biblical. Opiates are devastating, they
are flooding the county. Pills are cheap, and are everywhere and
easy to get. People in this region are desperate to do anything they
can to stem the tide. Opiates and pregnancy are part of this flood.4
For that reason, in the spring of 2014, Barry Staubus, the elected
District Attorney in Sullivan County, Tennessee, testified before the
state’s General Assembly.5 He was there to support a law that would
create a new crime: the crime of fetal assault.6 Under the proposed
law, a woman was guilty of assault if (1) she took a narcotic, (2) she
did not have a prescription for that narcotic, and (3) her infant was
harmed as a result.7 After all, when women take opiates during
pregnancy, it can affect their infants in the short term.8 The
primary diagnosis for these babies is Neonatal Abstinence Syn-
drome, or NAS.9 Although there are significant questions about
1.  Richard S. Venable, Living in Sullivan County, SULLIVAN COUNTY TENN., http://
sullivancountytn.gov/node/20 [https://perma.cc/3PEV-2ZWK].
2. See About Us: NETWORKS Sullivan Partnership, NETWORKS SULLIVAN PARTNER-
SHIP, http://www.networkstn.com/about/sullivan-networks-partnership [https://perma.cc/W9
Y2-BH9L].
3. See Becky Campbell, NE Tennessee Prosecutors to Sue Drug Manufacturers over
Opioid Epidemic, JOHNSON CITY PRESS (June 13, 2017, 4:09 PM), https://www.johnsoncity
press.com/Health-Care/2017/06/13/Live [https://perma.cc/23F9-36Z6].
4. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
5. See Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Gen. Assemb., 59th
Sess. 2:04:00 (Tenn. Mar. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary
Comm. (I)], http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=269&clip_id=9050# [https://
perma.cc/86M6-KQDV] (testimony of Barry Staubus, District Attorney of Sullivan County).
6. See id.
7. 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 820 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)) (effective
Apr. 29, 2014) (expired July 1, 2016).
8. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
9. ANGELA M. MILLER ET AL., TENN. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, NEONATAL ABSTINENCE SYN-
DROME SURVEILLANCE ANNUAL REPORT 2016 1-2 (2016), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/
health/documents/nas/NAS_Annual_report_2016_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX5V-F2LV].
2019] PROSECUTING POVERTY, CRIMINALIZING CARE 813
what particular circumstances lead to NAS,10 there is no question
that some infants suffering from NAS shake and cry in the first
weeks of their life.11 Those with more serious symptoms can also
spend some time in neonatal intensive care.12 In 2013, the year
before the Sullivan County District Attorney testified, eighty-six
babies born in Sullivan County were diagnosed with NAS.13 For a
county with a population of 156,000 and only three birthing
hospitals, this felt like a serious part of the flood.14
When Staubus testified, he said everything one might expect. He
talked about the problem of NAS, the harm, and the overwhelming
crisis.15 He talked about infants suffering, punishing women, and
protecting innocent lives.16 But he also said something that was
surprising. Staubus said that the crime of fetal assault would
actually benefit the same mothers the law targeted:
I think when we see this statute ... we are going to be able to
bring lots and lots of women into a program we’re creating
specifically for drug addicted mothers and so I think that with
this statute, what we’ll see is that there will be a vacuum for
that and we’ll see a lot of programs and we’ll see a lot of judges
and we’ll see a lot of prosecutors wanting to do this and recom-
mending this and the judges I think will find the resources to do
it.17
The law subsequently passed, making Tennessee the only state
in the nation to explicitly criminalize in-utero transmission of
10. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
11. See Emmalee S. Bandstra et al., Prenatal Drug Exposure: Infant and Toddler Out-
comes, 29 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 245, 247, 249 (2010).
12. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
13. ANGELA M. MILLER & MICHAEL D. WARREN, TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, NEONATAL
ABSTINENCE SYNDROME SURVEILLANCE ANNUAL REPORT 2013 25 (2013), https://www.tn.gov/
content/dam/tn/health/documents/nas/NAS_Annual_report_2013_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K6PC-J8SF].
14. See Venable, supra note 1; TENN. JUSTICE CTR., COUNTING THE COST: HOW THE GAP
IN HEALTH CARE COVERAGE IMPACTS ALL TENNESSEANS 10 (2015), https://tnjustice.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2015-11-17-Counting-the-Cost-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7HSC-M67G].
15. See Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (I), supra note 5, at 2:13:00.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 2:15:09.
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illegally obtained opiates to a fetus.18 During that period, at least
124 women were prosecuted for this offense.19 Although legislators
and other supporters offered a variety of justifications for the law,
including incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence,20 this Article
focuses on a fourth, and quite unique justification offered in support
of the statute: that the creation of the crime would generate
opportunities for the creation and distribution of social welfare
support (in the form of addiction treatment) to the women who were
prosecuted.
The extraordinary idea, that a state might create a crime not to
punish or to exact retribution but to provide care to the defendants
prosecuted for the offense, is not quite as dissonant as it might first
sound. It in fact arises from a very particular history. As has been
thoroughly documented by a variety of historians, sociologists, and
legal scholars, since the 1970s social welfare resources targeted at
poor families envisioned and created during the New Deal and the
Great Society have been largely deconstructed.21 To the extent that
these social welfare resources have been left in place or recon-
structed, they are now found deeply intertwined with the punitive
agencies of the state.22 In the world of courts, this intertwining is
most evident in the extraordinary growth, since the late 1980s, of a
new generation of problem-solving courts.23 Both the broad trend of
criminalizing social welfare support, and the more narrow trend of
manifesting this collapse by locating resources to solve social wel-
fare problems within courts, have been widely critiqued.24 Central
among these critiques is the fear that when the law merges care and
punishment, it both draws more individuals into punitive institu-
tions (what scholars have called “net-widening”)25 and compromises
the quality of the care overall.26
Tennessee’s implementation of the fetal assault law provides a
unique window into both on-the-ground results of this history and
18. See infra note 213.
19. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
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the implications of those trends. This Article is the first in a series
of publications arising from an empirical study of the implementa-
tion of this law. Other parts of the study, and subsequent publica-
tions, will focus on other crucial questions, such as the effectiveness
of the prosecutions in targeting women whose infants were diag-
nosed with NAS, the significance of the fact that it appears that the
large majority of defendants were white women, and the reality of
what has happened to care resources in poor communities. This
initial Article, however, focuses on the reality of care as it has
played out in the Eastern Appalachian region of Tennessee where
the majority of prosecutions took place, and what this evidence
might tell us about the idea that creating a crime creates care.
Specifically, this Article asks, and begins to answer, two central
questions. First, if the fetal assault law was justified as using the
mechanisms of the criminal system to provide care, was this care
plan for everyone or just for some? The study data reveals what the
Article terms prosecuting poverty: the prosecutions targeted almost
exclusively poor women. So the first thing the data reveals is that
if this were a road to access care, it was a road used not for every-
one, but only for the poor. 
Second, if the law was justified as a road to care, was the
provision of care a priority? More precisely, what happened in the
hospital setting and what happened in the criminal setting that
promoted or undermined access to care? The answers provided here
are three-fold. First, the prosecutions were supported by extensive
medical evidence gathered in the hospital setting and shared with
child welfare, police, and prosecutors.27 The sheer breadth of this
data collection and data sharing raises serious questions about how
linking healthcare to prosecution undermines the confidentiality
necessary for high-quality care.28 Second, in the criminal system
itself, the files reveal that for the majority of the low-income women
prosecuted for this crime there is no indication that the provision of
care was central to the prosecution.29 What we learn instead is that
the criminal system did not prioritize care. Instead the women faced
what most people face when they are prosecuted: bail, jail, fees,
27. See infra Part IV.A.1.
28. See infra Part IV.A.1.
29. See infra Part III.D.
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tremendous pressure to plead guilty, then monitoring and, often,
more jail and more fines.30 Although the law was described by its
supporters as a “velvet hammer” leading to care, the focus of the
prosecution was, to put it bluntly, just a hammer.31 Admittedly, that
characterization does not describe every case. The court files that
are at the center of this Article indicate that, for a minority of the
women, the case did involve some offer of treatment.32 These offers
of treatment, however, came with extraordinary risk. Treatment
was often offered along with incarceration and exorbitant criminal
justice fees, and the failure to comply resulted in even more harsh
punishment.33 Thus, to the extent prosecution provided a road to
care, it was a road lined with tremendous risk of punishment.
Importantly, these findings raise serious questions about the reality
of what it means to link care to punishment, questions that have
broad implications for both the health care and legal fields, lending
more credence to the argument that linking care to punishment
ultimately debases care.
To tell this socio-legal story, this Article proceeds in four parts.
Part I draws the lens back, situating this Tennessee story in a long
history of the links between punishment and care in poor communi-
ties in America, concluding with a focus on the existence of today’s
version of problem-solving courts and the role of jails as care pro-
viders of last resort. Part I also focuses on the critiques waged, by
a variety of scholars, against contemporary systems that link
punishment and care, both in the court systems and beyond. Part II
contextualizes the Tennessee story within the dramatic rise in
opiate use and abuse over the last decade, provides data on the
rising numbers of infants affected by opiate abuse, and frames what
we know about the problem that Tennessee legislators were seeking
to address. Part III turns to Tennessee. It describes the legislation
at issue and argues, based on a detailed review of the legislative
history, that the law was justified in large part as a means to
provide care to women using opiates. Having laid that context, Part
III turns to data from two sources. First, relying on data from
Tennessee birth records and criminal court files, it demonstrates
30. See infra notes 312-16 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part III.D.
32. See infra Part III.D.
33. See infra Part II.D.3-4.
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that the law was targeted almost exclusively at poor women.
Second, relying on detailed analysis of the court files of the cases of
forty-one women who were prosecuted in the Eastern Appalachian
region of the state, Part III lays out the treatment and punishment
trajectories of the cases as they were recorded in those files. In the
end, the files reveal that, while the law was justified in part as a
road to care, for the poor women who were prosecuted, any notion
that their receipt of care was a priority in their cases was either
entirely illusory or profoundly debased. Part IV concludes the
Article by relinking this story to the larger historical trends
described in Part I. The concluding Part draws on some qualitative
research data as well as some data from the fields of social work,
psychology, and pediatrics, and argues that, rather than continuing
to collapse care into punitive systems, we must reverse course by
separating care from punishment and building systems that sup-
port both families and communities.
I. HYPERINCARCERATION AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY
For the last several years, there has been significant scholarly
attention on the structures and historical groundings of hyper-
incarceration34 and what many refer to as the carceral state.35
Thanks to the work of scholars such as Michelle Alexander36 and
James Forman,37 among many others,38 what used to be known only
34. The prefix “hyper” as opposed to the prefix “mass” is used to connote the targeted
nature of these socio-legal phenomena. See Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State:
Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 336 (2014) (citing Frank
Rudy Cooper, Hyper-Incarceration as a Multidemensional Attack: Replying to Angela Harris
Through The Wire, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 67, 68-69 (2011)). Hyperincarceration targets
particular communities by race, class, gender, and place. Id. For a more extensive discussion
of the use of this term and its grounding in the work of Loïc Wacquant, see id. at 334-38.
35. The term “carceral state” describes “the sprawling, dynamic network of policies,
institutions, personnel, and apparatuses through which federal, state, local, and tribal
governments exercise power to police, prosecute, and punish.” Janet Moore, Isonomy,
Austerity, and the Right to Choose Counsel, 51 IND. L. REV. 167, 177 (2018) (citing MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2015)).
36. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
37. See generally JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
BLACK AMERICA (2017). 
38. See, e.g., NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016); GOTTSCHALK, supra note 35.
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by those touched by or working in the criminal legal system, has
become more common knowledge. The U.S. incarcerates a far higher
percentage of its population than any other nation.39 We not only
incarcerate, but we impose punitive consequences far beyond the
prison walls. Post-release conditions severely limit those subject to
them,40 and the presence of a conviction often severely restricts
employment and housing opportunities, as well as voting rights.41
We ensnare poor people in a web of fines and fees from which escape
is extremely difficult, resulting in a host of tangible harms.42 The
burdens of this larger carceral state are born disproportionately by
poor African American people, and the geographic concentration of
these effects harms whole families and communities.43
At the same time that scholars have been developing this rich
literature on the carceral state, another group of scholars has fo-
cused on the criminalization of poverty in the social welfare field. It
has long been true that the receipt of poverty-based support is both
deeply stigmatized44 and deeply implicated in structural racism.45
Over the last several decades we have increasingly turned our at-
tention to the way in which the mechanisms and modalities of
criminal law agencies have moved over to the social welfare state.
Two notable works in this area, Kaaryn Gustafson’s Cheating Wel-
fare46 and Khiara Bridges’ The Poverty of Privacy Rights47 paint this
picture. In Cheating Welfare, Gustafson argues persuasively that,
since 1996, the government has increasingly imported the mecha-
nisms and modalities of criminal law into the welfare system.48
39. See ALEXANDER, supra note 36, at 6.
40. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 35, at 241-57.
41. For an extensive discussion of the many consequences of a criminal conviction see
generally Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315 (2017).
42. For an extensive recent discussion of this problem, see PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME
TO BE POOR 8-15, 26 (2017).
43. See ALEXANDER, supra note 36, at 121-24.
44. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY
OF WELFARE 1890-1935 5 (1994); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 238-39 (1986).
45. See, e.g., JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE
WAR ON POVERTY 4-5 (1994).
46. KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIM-
INALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011).
47. KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017).
48. See generally GUSTAFSON, supra note 46.
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Recipients are finger-imaged, stings are run within welfare offices,
and recipients are being made to feel that the very act of applying
for and receiving benefits is a crime.49 Drawing another piece of the
picture, Bridges demonstrates that, in the area of public benefits
and beyond, while privacy rights exist for those with economic
privilege, poor mothers simply do not hold these rights.50 For poor
women, “state intervention, coercion, and regulation” are the
norm.51
But these two systems, the carceral state on the one hand and the
social welfare system on the other, do not work entirely independ-
ently. They are in fact, quite intertwined.52 For example, in Prison,
Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Women, Dorothy
Roberts describes the way that prisons and foster care agencies
work in tandem to heighten the punishment of black women and
their children.53 Similarly Victor Rios’s Punished paints a vivid
picture of the way that social welfare institutions in highly policed
areas are deeply intertwined with police and probation staff to
stigmatize and criminalize young black and Latino men.54
Building on Roberts’ focus on system intersections, I argued in
The Hyperregulatory State that, for poor women, and disproportion-
ately for poor African American women, social welfare support is
closely tethered to punitive arms of the state.55 These harms are
often accomplished through a phenomenon I termed regulatory
intersectionality: the means by which social welfare systems collect
and transmit evidence of purportedly deviant conduct from social
welfare systems to child welfare and criminal systems, resulting in
escalating risk of harm and escalating harms for poor women who
seek support.56 I described the administrative underpinnings of
these regulatory intersections and escalating harms in two contexts:
49. See id. at 56-57.
50. See generally BRIDGES, supra note 47.
51. See id. at 205.
52. See generally Bach, supra note 34.
53. Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Moth-
ers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1476 (2012).
54. VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS 38, 91-93
(2011).
55. See Bach, supra note 34, at 318.
56. See id. at 319.
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welfare drug testing and earlier cases of the criminalization of in-
utero drug transmission.57
In another striking example of these intersections, in The New
Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of
Black Women in Subsidized Housing, Priscilla Ocen described the
targeting of African American Section 8 voucher holders by an
astounding and devastating set of collaborations between social wel-
fare, juvenile, and criminal system actors in three California cities,
including two suburban communities outside of Los Angeles.58
These trends have been noted not only by legal scholars but also
by historians and political scientists. For example, in 2017, noted
political scientists Joe Soss and Vesla Weaver published a piece in
the Annual Review of Political Science pointing out that the field of
political science’s focus on the devastation of democratic participa-
tion in what they term “race-class subjugated communities” has left
political scientists unable to adequately respond to the building up
of policing in those communities.59 Central among their observations
is that:
In [race-class subjugated] communities today, police, courts, and
welfare agencies work alongside one another as interconnected
authorities and instruments of governance. The densely woven
fabric of social control encompasses a host of “collaborative
practices and shared information systems between welfare
offices and various branches of the criminal justice system.” Core
functions of social provision—such as housing, employment,
physical and mental health, and education—are carried out on
a large scale by agencies of the carceral state; in fact, prisons are
now the largest public providers of mental health services in the
United States. In agencies such as Child Protective Services, the
pursuit of child welfare goals blends seamlessly into the policing
and prosecution of criminal negligence and abuse. In traditional
means-tested welfare programs, officials employ criminal logics
57. See id.
58. Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Po-
licing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1543-45, 1576-77
(2012).
59. Joe Soss & Vesla Weaver, Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and
the Policing of Race-Class Subjugated Communities, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 565, 565-68
(2017).
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of “penalty for violation” to discipline clients and aggressively
investigate and prosecute cases of welfare fraud as felonies.60
A. Historical Roots
As discussed in more detail below, the Tennessee fetal assault law
was justified, in large part, as a mechanism to connect women
struggling with addiction to treatment.61 Although it would turn out
that the vast majority of women who were prosecuted did not go to
drug courts, the law was linked, during the hearings, to Tennessee’s
drug courts, a set of courts that arise from the modern problem-
solving court movement.62 These courts are designed to rehabilitate
offenders.63 As one legislator articulated it, the prosecutions were
“offering [the] mothers the help they so desperately need but cannot
obtain on their own.”64
The idea that courts are a locus of care for poor communities is
hardly a new one. In U.S. history these ideas can be traced to the
1920s and the Progressive Era.65 Michael Willrich’s City of Courts
provides a stunning window into this history as it was born and
played out in Progressive Era Chicago.66 In the 1920s, Chicago was
at the forefront of progressive politics.67 In that era, “[a] progressive
understanding of the criminal implied a social conception of crime
and criminal responsibility: a recognition that much of the human
behavior that society called ‘crime’ was in fact caused by forces of
biological destiny or socioeconomic circumstance beyond the indi-
vidual’s control.”68 This fundamental shift in assumptions about the
roots of crime gave rise to a set of courts that “aimed not merely to
punish offenders but to assist and discipline entire urban popula-
tions .... Urban court systems grew more powerful than ever during
60. Id. at 577 (citations omitted) (quoting GUSTAFSON, supra note 46).
61. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Part III.D.3.
63. See Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417,
441 (2009).
64. See Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (I), supra note 5.
65. See MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA
CHICAGO, at xxi, xxxviii-xxxix (2003).
66. See generally id.
67. Id. at xxi, xxvi.
68. Id. at xxi.
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these years, partly by incorporating the therapeutic disciplinary
techniques of psychiatry, medicine, and social work into everyday
judicial practice.”69 The result was a series of courts targeting
particular populations and issues.70 In Progressive Era Chicago,
there were domestic relations courts, targeting poor husbands who
were failing to provide for their families; moral courts, targeting
primarily prostitution; and juvenile and boys courts, targeting youth
crime.71 There was, too, a “Psychopathic Laboratory,” deeply
intertwined with eugenicist ideas and practices, that purported to
examine and propose interventions for defendants, often to devas-
tating effect.72 These courts aimed not just to hold individuals
accountable for criminal actions, but to bring a multidisciplinary
approach to reforming the individuals and, by extension, their
communities.73
Ultimately Willrich concludes that “[w]ithout discounting the
meaningfulness and ethical claim of the progressives’ expansive
social conception of crime ... we can now see that, in those local in-
stitutions where the progressives put their ideas into practice, the
result was often an intensified scrutiny and control of individual
offenders and their families.”74 In other words, to the extent that the
courts offered help, it was help at a cost. As to cause, Willrich states
that 
[m]uch of this outcome surely had to do with the fact that, in the
absence of a more developed welfare state, progressives tried to
enact so much of their social reform agenda through the
machinery of criminal courts, where the lines between criminal-
ity and dependency, welfare and policing, vanished perhaps too
easily.75
For the purposes of this Article, that observation—that the absence
of independent social welfare resources perhaps led to the outcomes
Willrich described—is prescient. Although we do not find ourselves
69. Id. at xxviii-xxix.
70. See id. at xxix.
71. Id. at 132-33, 174, 210.
72. Id. at 242-45.
73. Id. at 241, 277.
74. Id. at 320.
75. Id. at 320-21.
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in the exact same position today, it appears that current manifesta-
tions of the linking of social welfare provision to scrutiny, punish-
ment, policing, and courts—described by scholars such as Roberts,
Bridges, Ocen, Soss, Weaver, and myself—never quite went away
and in fact began building up significantly in the mid-1960s.76
For that history, we have to fast-forward from the Progressive
Era, through the New Deal, to the early 1960s and the War on Pov-
erty. The New Deal brought us several key poverty-focused support
programs, including Old Age Insurance (colloquially social security),
public housing, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (col-
loquially welfare).77 The War on Poverty significantly expanded the
scope of support programs for low-income families.78 In terms of
social welfare state development, that era gave rise to significant
federally funded support programs including Medicare, Medicaid,
and Food Stamps.79 It also saw a dramatic growth in Aid to Families
With Dependent Children, a program that began during the New
Deal as a fairly small program for white widows but would grow,
during the 1960s, to support a far larger and more racially diverse
population.80 In this way, the social welfare state that Willrich
stated did not exist during the Progressive Era came into existence
during the 1930s and grew substantially in the 1960s.81 Despite this
significant growth, the United States has never provided support in
poor communities on the scale of other democracies.82 Key supports,
such as universal healthcare, high-quality schools, and comprehen-
sive mental health services, to name just a few, have never existed
on the scale necessary to provide significant support.83 In addition,
76. See generally supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
77. See WILLRICH, supra note 65, at 313; Lawrence M. Friedman, Public Housing and the
Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 642, 642 (1966).
78. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 46, at 23-24.
79. See id.
80. Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The
Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457, 460, 480-83
(1987).
81. See KATZ, supra note 44, at 246-47, 254; Bach, supra note 34, at 330-31.
82. See Social Spending Stays at Historically High Levels in Many OECD Countries, ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (October 2016), http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2016-
Social-Expenditure-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/V49B-TNZT].
83. See Bach, supra note 34, at 318-19.
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the link between social support, punishment, policing, and courts
continued apace.84
Elizabeth Hinton’s From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime
traces the roots of these institutional intersections.85 Hinton
demonstrates that, with the exception of a brief period during the
early 1960s during which the Johnson administration invested
heavily in community programs delinked from local government, the
War on Crime began nearly simultaneously with the War on
Poverty and led to a series of structural links between those two
systems that remain with us today.86 Beginning in the late 1960s,
federal policymakers began to not only radically disinvest in com-
munity-based support, but they began integrating the policing and
surveillance of urban African American youth into the very fabric of
U.S. urban social welfare programs.87 Ever focused on “potentially
delinquent” black youth, 1960s Youth-Service Bureaus integrated
law enforcement into recreational, education, and employment pro-
grams.88 “By the mid-1970s, federal disinvestment from the public
sector and the remnants of the War on Poverty programs meant
social welfare agencies in urban centers had little choice but to
incorporate crime control measures in their basic programming in
order to receive funding.”89
Over time, basic and vital social supports, such as public housing
and schools, became sites for surveillance, policing, and criminali-
zation.90 Take, for example, the Carter-era Urban Initiatives Anti-
Crime Program, which “establish[ed] stronger partnerships between
social and law enforcement institutions and devot[ed] the majority
of funds to surveillance and security needs.”91 In so doing, the
84. See id.
85. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING
OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2016).
86. See id. at 61-62. For a more detailed history of Community Action and the mandate
that Community Action programs be designed and run with the “maximum feasible
participation” of the poor and the political contest over community control, see generally
Wendy A. Bach, Mobilization and Poverty Law: Searching for Participatory Democracy Amid
the Ashes of the War on Poverty, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 96 (2012) and the sources cited
therein.
87. HINTON, supra note 85, at 61-62.
88. Id. at 119.
89. Id. at 236.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 288.
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Program “vastly enhanced the scope and power of punitive authori-
ties in the most deteriorated and segregated public housing sites in
the country.”92 By that time, “law enforcement and criminal justice
institutions could involve themselves in virtually any community-
based effort.”93
This history has many implications, two of which are important
to contextualizing the Tennessee story. The first is the rise of
today’s problem-solving courts, and the second is the reality and
effect today of the placing of care resources into punitive arms of the
state.
B. Today’s Problem-Solving Courts
In the late 1980s, as the War on Crime continued to escalate, the
prison population grew exponentially.94 At the same time, the social
safety net remained profoundly inadequate to meet the needs of
those struggling in poor communities and resources for mental
health deteriorated.95 As a result, judges saw before them an in-
creasingly devastated and systemically failed population.96 In what
in retrospect seems an inevitable development, the modern version
of the problem-solving court movement was born.97 Since the found-
ing of the Miami Drug Court in 1989, this movement, posited as a
direct response to the War on Drugs and the presence, in courts, of
individuals with enormous need, has exploded.98 Rather than focus-
ing efforts on shrinking the feeder systems that led to the crimi-
nalization of wide swaths of poor communities or the devastation of
social welfare resources in what Soss and Weaver call “race-class
subjugated communities,”99 the problem-solving court movement
took this criminalization as a given.100 In the face of this, they
92. Id.
93. Id. at 293.
94. Id. at 314.
95. See id. at 314-16.
96. See Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 270 (2008).
97. While the modern problem-solving court movement can be traced to the founding of
the Miami Drug Court in 1989, the idea of courts as problem solvers finds older roots in the
history of juvenile and family courts. See Spinak, supra note 96, at 259-60; see also Miller,
supra note 63, at 420.
98. See generally Miller, supra note 63.
99. See Soss & Weaver, supra note 59, at 567.
100. See Miller, supra note 63, at 432.
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sought a way to respond for those individuals who found themselves
subject to prosecution and potential incarceration.101 Today there
are over 3000 problem-solving courts found throughout every state
in the nation.102 They include not only the traditional drug courts,
but a wide range of specialized courts, including domestic violence
courts, mental health courts, veterans courts, and community
courts, just to name a few.103 They are supported by significant
federal, state, and local funding streams, a series of well-funded
national organizations, and a robust research agenda evaluating
their effectiveness along several metrics.104
Echoing their progressive precursors, problem-solving courts
embrace rather than reject the central role of courts and judges in
solving social problems. As described in 2007 by the Center for
Court Innovation (CCI), a leader in the field: “At their core was the
idea that it was no longer enough just to arrest, process, and
adjudicate an offender, but law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
judges, and probation officers also needed to try to reduce recidi-
vism, improve public confidence in justice, and prevent crime down
the road.”105 To accomplish these objectives, problem-solving courts
incorporate a rehabilitative model within the court system, with
the judge at the helm.106
Problem-solving courts purport to accomplish this objective by
“customizing punishment ... thereby reducing the likelihood of re-
peat offending and increasing the likelihood that the offender can
become a productive member of society.”107 There is broad consensus
101. See id. at 436-37.
102. About NADCP, NAT’L ASSOC’N DRUG CT. PROFS., www.nadcp.org/about [https://perma.
cc/EDM5-8NBF].
103. See ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, PRINCIPLES OF PROBLEM-SOLVING
JUSTICE 1 (2007), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Principles.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2VE7-959D].
104. See Suzanne M. Strong et al., Census of Problem-Solving Courts, 2012, BUREAU JUST.
STATS. (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpsc12.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GCS-
9ZEU]; Statewide Coordination of Problem-Solving Courts: A Snapshot of Five States, CTR.
FOR CT. INNOVATION, https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CCI_ProblemSolvingCoord.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MMU2-5WM7].
105. WOLF, supra note 103, at 1.
106. See Mitchell B. MacKinem & Paul Higgins, Introduction to PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS:
JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, at vii (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. MacKinem eds.,
2009).
107. WOLF, supra note 103, at 7.
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among those who support and promote this movement that courts
and judges are “at the hub of a complex system.”108 They bring a
wide range of services together under one roof.109 For example the
Red Hook Community Justice Center, highlighted by CCI, brings
in “local non-profits and government agencies that have agreed to
place staff on-site to provide health care, youth counseling, job
training, and other needed services.”110 Access to these services for
noncriminally involved community members is sometimes present
in the courts, but it appears as an afterthought. For example, in
CCI’s highlighting of the Seattle Community Court, another court
that offers extensive colocation of services, “[s]ervices are geared
primarily to mandated offenders but are also available on a vol-
untary basis to walk-ins from the community.”111
These courts have been subject to significant critiques, three of
which are central for understanding the Tennessee case study.
First, these courts have been critiqued for what scholars call “net-
widening.”112 This critique argues that, because of the nature of the
court processes, individuals who might have otherwise either been
diverted out of the system entirely or would have received very
minimal punishment, are instead brought within far more invasive
and long-term monitoring by the courts.113 This is true both in drug
courts and in community courts—those courts established specifi-
cally to use community-based adjudication to solve intractable
108. Id. at 5.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1551-61 (2004).
113. Id.; see also Richard C. Boldt, A Circumspect Look at Problem-Solving Courts, in
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, supra note 106, at 13,
17 (“[D]rug treatment courts and many other problem-solving courts serve to extend the reach
of the criminal system, by retaining in the system defendants who otherwise might not be
subject to criminal justice control and by failing to divert a significant number of other
offenders—often those facing more serious changes—into alternative treatment-based
dispositions. Drug treatment courts thus may produce a ‘net widening’ effect by channeling
into the system defendants who would otherwise have avoided a criminal justice system
disposition.”); Jane M. Spinak, A Conversation About Problem-Solving Courts: Take 2, 10 U.
MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 113, 118 (2010) (“[T]he creation of problem-solving
courts may result in more families being drawn into the court system—often referred to as
‘net widening’—because the lack of community resources leaves the court as the only place
to secure help.” (footnotes omitted)).
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problems in poor communities.114 For example, the first community
court, established in New York City, was part and parcel of the
broken windows theory of policing and was “designed to handle a
wide range of low-level misdemeanor offenses that generally were
not prosecuted at all prior to ... the establishment of these new
courts.”115
Second, critics worry that problem-solving courts inevitably draw
social welfare resources out of communities and voluntary settings
and into inevitably coercive courts.116 For example, Anthony Thomp-
son argued in 2002 that linking the provision of social services to
the existence of community courts provides low-income communities
with what might be a less than ideal option.117 As he framed it, “[i]n
the absence of other alternatives, [community residents] embrace
the notion of community courts because these courts bring with
them a wide range of services. Given the choice, however, communi-
ties may prefer to access the services without the court structure.”118
There is some evidence that Thompson’s early fears are proving
prescient. In a recent symposium on community courts, Robin
Steinberg and Skylar Albertson explained that, “most community
courts follow a postdisposition model for the provision of social
services, meaning that the courts require admission of guilt before
they will grant individuals access to court-sponsored resources.”119
Similarly, critics have argued that the need for mental health
courts, another prominent form of problem-solving courts, is
a direct response to the problem of large numbers of persons
with mental disabilities coming into the criminal justice system
as a consequence of a history of deinstitutionalization and the
failure of the community mental health system. Some experts
have observed that these problem-solving courts, while essential
in dealing with this influx in the short term, absorb resources
114. Miller, supra note 112, at 1551-61; Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some
Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 63 (2002).
115. Boldt, supra note 113, at 18.
116. See id. at 19.
117. Thompson, supra note 114, at 91-92.
118. Id. at 92.
119. Robin Steinberg & Skylar Albertson, Broken Windows Policing and Community
Courts: An Unholy Alliance, 37 CARODOZO L. REV. 995, 1016 (2016); see also Spinak, supra note
96, at 267 (“[M]ost treatment courts require a guilty plea, admission to child maltreatment,
or waiver of other due process rights as conditions of participating in the court.”).
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that could be directed toward ameliorating the problems more
systemically.120
Finally, critics argue that, even in the face of sincere dedication
to centering rehabilitation, punishment almost inevitably pre-
vails.121 As Jane Spinak explains, “you can hold out the promise of
cure in a court system only if you have the means to enforce that
cure. Failure to seek or submit to a cure or even failure to succeed
in that cure inevitably leads to escalating punishment.”122 Often
that punishment is far more severe than the person would have
received had they not participated in the drug court.123
In 2009, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
issued a report on problem-solving courts.124 They highlighted the
elevated punishments associated with failure in drug court in
comparison to the punishments defendants would have received had
they simply pled guilty to the offense.125
For example, a simple crack possession case will usually net a
10- to 20- day jail sentence in Manhattan. A defendant may wait
20 to 30 days for placement in a [drug court] program. If
defendants enter a treatment program and fail, they may be
sentenced to six months in jail.126
So while problem-solving courts may at times provide some assis-
tance, these successes come at the cost of bringing more individuals
into the system, elevating the risk and severity of punishment for
those who participate, increasingly linking the provision of care to
the mechanisms of punishment, and depriving communities of social
welfare resources that might otherwise be there to assist those who
might voluntarily seek support.
120. Boldt, supra note 113, at 19.
121. See Spinak, supra note 96, at 265.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 267.
124. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., AMERICA’S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL
COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/drugcourts/
[https://perma.cc/MZ9L-YYQU].
125. Id. at 8, 29.
126. Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted).
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C. Jail as the New Safety Net
Another perhaps inevitable result of lack of investment in
community-based social welfare services and the linking of social
welfare resources to punitive institutions is the unique role that
jails have come to play in providing social support to those in
poverty. Carolyn Sufrin’s Jailcare: Finding the Safety Net Behind
Bars provides a window into this reality.127 Sufrin is a physician and
anthropologist who worked for many years in a women’s jail in San
Francisco.128 Starting with the strange fact that the incarcerated are
the only population in the United States with a constitutional right
to healthcare,129 Sufrin provides a rich and nuanced description of
how care is provided in that setting.130 She argues, starkly, that,
“[j]ail is the new safety net.”131 Throughout her narrative, we meet
women who choose to be incarcerated in order to receive care and
who come to count on jail as a place where they can receive that
care.132 Sufrin provides not only a nuanced look into these realities,
but a sharp and clear indictment of the structures that lead to wom-
en viewing jail as a respite and a source of care.133 As she frames it,
[j]ailcare is a symptom of social failure, of abandonment of a
group of people that includes poor, predominantly black women,
whose reproduction has been vilified in policies and broader
cultural narratives. Jailcare illustrates how mass incarceration
and the frayed safety net are matters of reproductive justice, for
they impair women’s abilities to parent their children in stable
and safe environments. The safety net’s shortcomings are not
simply a matter of quantity or funding, although shortages of
public mental health care, housing, and addiction treatment
absolutely play a role. Safety net inadequacies also emerge from
the ways services are delivered, from ... the nature of the
interpersonal relationships and how people are made to feel
when accessing services .... Jailcare reflects the failure of society
127. See CAROLYN SUFRIN, JAILCARE: FINDING THE SAFETY NET FOR WOMEN BEHIND BARS
(2017).
128. Id. at ix-xi.
129. See id. at 7 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
130. See id. at 6-7.
131. Id. at 5.
132. See id. at 208-26.
133. See id. at 215-17.
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to provide an adequate safety net and the failure of our social
imagination to consider that these women have contributions to
make to society.134
In the historical context and current reality laid out above, the
idea that creating a crime might be a good way to get care to women
struggling with substance abuse seems perhaps slightly less
dissonant. Given the state of community-based social welfare re-
sources and the increasingly central role that courts and jails pur-
port to play in providing care, it makes a certain amount of sense
that legislators thought that this might provide a road to care.
Tennessee is, after all, facing a profound health crisis.135 It is to that
crisis, and the Tennessee response, that the following Part turns.
II. OPIATES AND NEONATAL ABSTINENCE SYNDROME
Tennessee’s fetal assault legislation was framed as a response to
what prosecutors and judges across the state considered a crisis
facing infants in Tennessee.136 Proponents of the bill shared video
footage of images of infants suffering from Neonatal Abstinence
Syndrome, the primary medical diagnosis of infants who are
exposed to opiates prenatally and exhibit a defined set of symptoms
in the weeks after birth.137 These images are powerful, showing
neonatal intensive care units filled with infants shaking and crying,
seemingly uncontrollably.138 These images drove the legislation.139
Barry Staubus, the head District Attorney for Sullivan County,
testified in favor of the bill in the Spring of 2014 and characterized
the crisis in dramatic terms: “We are drowning in east Tennessee ...
with these babies and we feel powerless.”140
Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, or NAS, is a diagnosis associated
with infants exposed in-utero to opiates, as well as to some other
prescription medications.141 Not all infants who are exposed develop
134. Id. at 236.
135. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
136. See Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (I), supra note 5.
137. Id. at 2:09:00-2:12:15.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id. at 2:14:05.
141. While NAS is predominantly associated with opiate exposure, it can also arise from
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symptoms of NAS.142 Those who do exhibit withdrawal symptoms
“ranging from feeding difficulties to seizures.”143 There is no ques-
tion that there are significant short-term effects of NAS.144 Infants
diagnosed with NAS can have increased rates of perinatal mortality,
exhibit “[s]ignificant disruption [of] sleep patterns” and are at an
increased “risk of SIDS and SUDI (sudden unexpected death in
infancy).”145 They are “more likely to have respiratory diagnoses ...
to have low birthweight ... have feeding difficulties ... and have sei-
zures.”146 NAS cases range dramatically in the severity of symptoms
and the necessary interventions, and there is significant debate in
the medical literature about the appropriate care of infants diag-
nosed with NAS.147 Many infants require only monitoring and do
well through interventions such as “rooming-in,” in which mothers
and infants stay together in the same room, and breastfeeding.148
Others require more serious short-term interventions including
medication and stays in the neonatal intensive care unit.149
While some short-term effects of NAS are well documented, and
the medical community is making substantial progress in the
treatment of NAS in infants,150 there is no conclusive evidence that
exposure to other substances. See CE Witt et al., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and Early
Childhood Morbidity and Mortality in Washington State: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 37 J.
PERINATOLOGY 1124, 1124 (2017).
142. The question of what kinds of exposure and what level of exposure will lead to NAS
is not well understood. See Stephen W. Patrick et al., Prescription Opioid Epidemic and Infant
Outcomes, 135 PEDIATRICS 842, 843 (2015) (citing Mark L. Hudak et al., Neonatal Drug
Withdrawal, 129 PEDIATRICS 540, 542 (2012)).
143. Id.
144. Rod W. Hunt et al., Adverse Neurodevelopmental Outcome of Infants Exposed to Opiate
In-Utero, 84 EARLY HUM. DEV. 29, 29, 32 (2008).
145. Id. at 32.
146. Stephen W. Patrick et al., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and Associated Health Care
Expenditures: United States, 2000-2009, 307 JAMA 1934, 1936 (2012).
147. See generally Matthew R. Grossman et al., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome: Time for
a Reappraisal, 7 HOSP. PEDIATRICS 115, 115-16 (2017) (alleging that reliance on the
traditional method of diagnosis and treatment of NAS could be outdated and hindering
healthcare providers’ ability to assess the effectiveness of nonpharmacological interventions
recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics); Kathryn Dee L. MacMillan & Alison
Volpe Holmes, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and the Pediatric Hospitalist: 5 Years Later,
8 HOSP. PEDIATRICS 51, 51 (2018) (noting the “significant variability in NAS care practices
across U.S. hospitals”).
148. See Grossman et al., supra note 147, at 116; Macmillan & Holmes, supra note 147, at
52.
149. See Patrick et al., supra note 146, at 1939.
150. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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NAS has any long-term effects.151 While some studies seem to
indicate that in-utero opiate exposure may correlate with longer-
term developmental effects,152 other studies have been inconclusive
or have reached the opposite conclusion.153 In studies that have
indicated correlations with various conditions, researchers found “no
significant differences” when they took other factors such as
“maternal education, [socioeconomic status], home environment,
maternal/caregiver IQ, and maternal psychological symptoms” into
consideration.154
The rising number of NAS diagnoses over the last two decades
has been driven by dramatic increases in the use and abuse of
opiates in the region, as well as perhaps due to an increase in
mechanisms to track the cases.155 Although it has long been true
that rates of illegal drug use and abuse are fairly consistent across
class and race,156 the rise of opiates in the early decades of the
twenty-first century represent a significant set of demographic and
geographic shifts.157 The problem stems, to a large degree, from
dramatic increases in opioid prescriptions.158 “From 1991 to 2011,
there was a near tripling of opioid prescriptions dispensed by U.S.
pharmacies: from 76 million to 219 million prescriptions.”159
Nationally, rates of prescription opiates rose steadily from 2006 to
151. See Bandstra et al., supra note 11, at 247-48.
152. Id. at 248.
153. See id. at 247-48; Hendrée E. Jones et al., The Complexity of Examining Developmental
Outcomes of Children Prenatally Exposed to Opiates. A Response to the Hunt et al. Adverse
Neurodevelopmental Outcome of Infants Exposed to Opiates In-Utero, 85 EARLY HUM. DEV. 29
(2009).
154. Jones et al., supra note 153, at 271.
155. See Grossman et al., supra note 147, at 115.
156. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH:
SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 26 (Sept. 2014), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/
files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHresults2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD7N-
BFVR] (“There were no statistically significant differences in the rates of current illicit drug
use between 2012 and 2013 for any of the racial/ethnic groups.”).
157. U.S. Prescribing Rate Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 31,
2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html [https://perma.cc/6WZG-
YYX6].
158. Increased Drug Availability Is Associated with Increased Use and Overdose, NAT’L
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2012, and then began falling.160 At the height of prescription rates
in 2012, there were over 255 million opiate prescriptions written.161
This meant that for every 100 people, doctors wrote 81.3 prescrip-
tions.162 Although national rates began to fall after 2012 to just
under 215 million prescriptions, or a rate of 66.5 prescriptions per
100 people in 2016, these falling national figures hide significant
regional and state variations.163 Rates remain tremendously high in
several regions, including Appalachia, the South, and several states
in the Midwest and Great Lakes Region.164 In 2016, in Tennessee,
Arkansas, and Alabama, there were over 107 opiate prescriptions
written for every 100 people.165 In Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Oklahoma, Kentucky, West Virginia, Indiana, and Mich-
igan, rates fell between 83 and 107 prescriptions per 100 people.166
Not only are these prescription rates concentrated in particular
regions, but they are evident at disproportionate rates among those
with lower incomes.167 “[T]he Medicaid patient population is more
likely to receive prescriptions for opioid pain medications and to
have opioids prescribed at higher doses and for longer periods of
time than the non-Medicaid patient population.”168 In addition,
“[r]acial-ethnic disparities in opioid prescription have been docu-
mented nationally, with minorities being less likely to receive
opioids.”169 White women are in fact significantly more likely than
African American women to use and abuse opiates and to die of an
160. Id.
161. U.S. Prescribing Rate Maps, supra note 157.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See U.S. State Prescribing Rates, 2016, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION




167. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB NO. (SMA) 16-4978, A
COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO THE TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN WITH OPIOID USE
DISORDERS 6 (2016), https://ncsacw.samhsa.gov/files/Collaborative_Approach_508.pdf [https://
perma.cc/YM5V-2557].
168. Id.
169. Astha Singhal et al., Racial-Ethnic Disparities in Opioid Prescriptions at Emergency
Department Visits for Conditions Commonly Associated with Prescription Drug Abuse, 11
PLOS ONE 1, 2 (2016) (citing M. J. Pletcher et al., Trends in Opioid Prescribing by Race/
Ethnicity for Patients Seeking Care in U.S. Emergency Departments, 299 JAMA 70 (2008)).
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opiate overdose.170 This confluence of factors leads to a concentration
of addiction in several white, poor, rural and geographically concen-
trated regions in the states.171
Along with these rises in the rates of opiate prescriptions is a dra-
matic increase in the number of overdose deaths due to opiates.172
As reported by the Centers for Disease Control, “[o]pioids were in-
volved in 42,249 deaths in 2016, and opioid overdose deaths were
five times higher in 2016 than 1999.”173 Again, these deaths are geo-
graphically concentrated with the highest rates occurring in West
Virginia, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.174
Neither women as a whole nor pregnant women are exempt from
these statistics.175 Between 1999 and 2010, “yearly prescription
opioid overdose deaths among women increased from 1287 to 6631.
These numbers represent a 400 percent increase over 10 years.”176
Like the overall trends, these trends manifest disproportionately
among low-income women.177 One study, “using data from Medicaid-
enrolled pregnant women from 47 states in the United States
reported that 21.6 percent of the women filled at least one opioid
prescription during their pregnancy.”178 In Tennessee, “[f]rom 1995-
2009, pregnancy-related use of opioid analgesics nearly doubled
among [Medicaid] participants.”179 Although rates are higher among
170. See Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional
Battlefront, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 781, 793-94 (2014) (citing COMMITTEE ON HEALTH CARE FOR
UNDERSERVED WOMEN, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS,
COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 538: NONMEDICAL USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 2 (2012), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22996128); Allen A. Mitchell et al., Medication Use During
Pregnancy, with Particular Focus on Prescription Drugs: 1976-2008, 205 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 51.e1, 51.e5 (2011); Leonard J. Paulozzi et al., Vital Signs: Overdoses of
Prescription Opioid Pain Relievers: United States, 1999-2009, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 1487, 1488 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6043.pdf [https://perma.
cc/SZM7-5YG2] (reporting that non-Hispanic white women have a higher drug overdose death
rate than women of other races).
171. Paulozzi et al., supra note 170, at 1487-88.




175. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 156, at 1, 3.
176. Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
177. See Mahsa M. Yazdy et al., Prescription Opioids in Pregnancy and Birth Outcomes:
A Review of the Literature, 4 J. PEDIATRIC GENETICS 56, 57 (2015).
178. Id.
179. Peter R. Martin & A. J. Reid Finlayson, Opioid Use Disorder During Pregnancy in
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poor women, women who use commercial health plans and are
therefore less likely to be low income “also showed high rates
(14.4%) of prescription opioid dispensing between 2005 and 2011.”180
These trends lead to a concentration of cases among infants and
their mothers both nationally and in Tennessee.181
Between 2006 and 2012, the rate of infant and maternal
hospitalizations related to substance use increased substan-
tially, from 5.1 to 8.7 per 1,000 infant hospitalizations and from
13.4 to 17.9 per 1,000 maternal hospitalizations .... In 2012,
among the neonatal stays with a substance-related condition,
approximately 60% were related to neonatal drug withdrawal or
NAS. Among maternal stays related to substance abuse, almost
one-fourth involved opioids.182
These trends are also notable in Tennessee.183 “From 2009-2011, the
rate of NAS among infants in [Tennessee Medicaid] increased from
6.0-10.7 per 1000 births and to 11.6 in 2013—representing a 16-fold
increase since 2000.”184 As the Tennessee Department of Health
noted in becoming the first state in the nation to require data re-
porting on NAS from providers, “[s]ince the early 2000s, the inci-
dence of NAS in Tennessee has increased by 10-fold, far exceeding
the national increase (3-fold over the same time period).”185
To understand the NAS trends, one has to understand a little
more about opiate use by pregnant women. The first thing to know
is that a large proportion of NAS cases develop as an expected re-
sult of the treatment of pregnant women for opiate addiction.186
Although there are some small and early studies that seem to
suggest that women can detox during pregnancy, and therefore limit
the exposure of the fetus to opiates,187 that research has been
Tennessee: Expediency vs. Science, 41 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 367, 367 (2015).
180. Yazdy et al., supra note 177, at 57.
181. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 156, at 6.
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. See Martin & Finlayson, supra note 179, at 367.
184. Id. (citations omitted).
185. MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
186. Robert D. Stewart et al., The Obstetrical and Neonatal Impact of Maternal Opioid
Detoxification in Pregnancy, 209 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 267, 267 (2013).
187. See, e.g., id. at 267; Jennifer Bell et al., Detoxification from Opiate Drugs During
Pregnancy, 215 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 374, 374 (2016).
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subject to challenge,188 and the long-standing medical consensus is
that pregnant women who are addicted to opiates should be treated
throughout their pregnancies with medication-assisted therapy, or
MAT.189 This means that pregnant women who suffer from addiction
are regularly prescribed opiates during their pregnancies.190 The
majority of infants who are born with NAS manifest these symp-
toms because of in-utero exposure to MAT.191 In addition, while it is
true that some infants develop NAS as a result of exposure to illicit
substances, comparatively few NAS cases arise from exposure to
only illicit substances.192 The Tennessee Department of Health,
relying on mandated reporting data,193 breaks exposure down into
three major categories: prescription only, illicit only, and both pre-
scription and illicit use.194 According to this data, the majority of
NAS cases (52.5 percent in 2016) result from prescription use of
opiates, predominantly the use of MAT.195 Less than 20 percent
(19.4 percent in 2016) result from purely illicit exposure, and finally
the remaining cases (27.2 percent) result from a combination of
illicit and legal exposure.196 In Tennessee in particular, illegal (as
188. See John J. McCarthy & Mishka Terplan, Detoxification from Opiates During
Pregnancy: Stressing the Fetal Brain, 215 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 670, 670 (2016).
But see Craig V. Towers & Mark D. Hennessy, Reply, 215 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
670, 671 (2016).
189. AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. ON OBSTETRIC PRAC., ACOG
COMMITTEE OPINION NO. 711: OPIOID USE AND OPIOID USE DISORDER IN PREGNANCY 6 (2017),
https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-
Obstetric-Practice/Opioid-Use-and-Opioid-Use-Disorder-in-Pregnancy. [https://perma.cc/
MY9V-MPH3] [hereinafter ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION].
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 8.
193. In 2013, in an effort to understand the scope and nature of the problem, the Tennessee
Department of Health began requiring hospitals to report the numbers of infants diagnosed
with NAS. Michael D. Warren et al., Implementation of a Statewide Surveillance System for
Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome—Tennessee, 2013, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. RPT.
125, 125 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6405a4.htm [https://
perma.cc/4VQ2-L5H4].
194. See id. at 126.
195. MILLER ET AL., supra note 9, at 1, 5, 8. Of the cases of prescription exposure resulting
in NAS in Tennessee, “[a]mong the 561 cases exposed to only prescription medications, 86.1%
(n=483) were exposed to medication assisted treatment for the mother’s substance use
disorder.” Id. at 6.
196. See id. at 8. There is a also a very small number of cases where the source of exposure
is unknown. See id.
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opposed to legal but diverted) opiates play a very small role.197 For
example, in 2016 only 3.8 percent of the NAS cases in Tennessee
resulted in whole or in part from the use of heroin.198
A. A Crisis and No Treatment Resources to Meet It
These overlapping crises of over-prescription, diversion of lawful-
ly prescribed substances, addiction overall and during pregnancy,
and NAS resulted in a serious public health emergency.199 The
ability to mitigate this crisis is significantly hampered by a serious
lack of treatment facilities.200 The Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, or SAMSHA, hosts a national
listing of available treatment resources.201 A recent search of
facilities that provide substance abuse treatment of any form in
Tennessee that accept Medicaid resulted in eighty-five programs in
the state.202 When that search was narrowed to facilities that are
willing to treat pregnant women and post-partum women only
twenty-three facilities were on the list.203 In 2014, a similar search
was run and journalists from America Tonight followed up with the
listed facilities seeking to gain information about whether there
were any open treatment beds.204 From the listing at that time, only
“[f]ive clinics confirmed that they allow pregnant women to enroll
in their residential treatment program and accept Medicaid. With
two of the programs completely full, there [were] fewer than 50 beds
in Tennessee available to pregnant drug users.”205
197. See id., at 6 tbl.1.
198. Id. at 6.
199. See ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION, supra note 189, at 2.
200. See Sanya Dosani, Should Pregnant Women Addicted to Drugs Face Criminal
Charges?, AL JAZEERA AM. (Mar. 31, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/
shows/america-tonight/articles/2014/9/4/should-pregnant-womenaddictedtodrugsfacecriminal
charges.html [https://perma.cc/4EVR-RCT9].
201. Behavioral Health Treatment Services Locator, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.findtreatment.samhsa.gov [https://perma.cc/48ZM-UYA2].
202. Locator Map, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.
findtreatment.samhsa.gov/locator?sAddr=Tennessee%2C%2%200USA&submit=Go [https://
perma.cc/VDL8-SEAQ] (enter “Tennessee” in search box and refine search by clicking the
relevant criteria).
203. See id. (narrowing the search to treatment of pregnant women and post-partum
women).
204. See Dosani, supra note 200.
205. Id.
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In Tennessee, as in the nation as a whole, there are concerted, if
significantly underfunded, efforts to address the opiate epidemic in
all its forms.206 In the particular area of use and abuse by pregnant
women, difficult research questions, from the appropriate treatment
of addicted pregnant women207 to the appropriate treatment of
infants with NAS,208 are at the heart of current scientific work and
merit substantial attention and resources.209 In addition, in light of
what we now understand to be a significant and unwarranted hy-
perbole predicting the long-term futures of cocaine-exposed in-
fants,210 caution is clearly called for. Two things, however, are clear.
First, throughout the regions hit hardest by the epidemic, there are
far too few treatment resources.211 Second, as made clear by the
studies of infants born exposed to crack, ensuring healthy outcomes
for poor children requires far more than just assuring that pregnant
women not ingest narcotics.212
III. TENNESSEE RESPONDS: PROSECUTING POVERTY AND
CRIMINALIZING CARE
This Part turns directly to the rationales offered for criminal-
ization of this conduct and, relying on the criminal court files and
birth and census data, to the demographics, trajectories, and out-
comes for women prosecuted in Tennessee. This Part pays particu-
lar attention to the role and effect on healthcare provision and on
evaluating whether or not the prosecutions were in fact a road to
care.
206. See ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION, supra note 189, at 2; Dosani, supra note 200.
207. See ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION, supra note 189, at 6-8.
208. See Mark L. Hudak & Rosemarie C. Tan, Neonatal Drug Withdrawal, 129 PEDIATRICS
540, 547-49 (2012).
209. See ACOG COMMITTEE OPINION, supra note 189, at 2-3; Hudak & Tan, supra note 208,
at 547-49.
210. See Grace Elizabeth Howard, The Criminalization of Pregnancy: Rights, Discretion,
and the Law 29-32 (Oct. 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file
with author).
211. See Dosani, supra note 200.
212. See Martin & Finlayson, supra note 179, at 367-68.
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A. Creating Crime to Create Care
The legislation criminalizing fetal assault in Tennessee was
originally proposed in the Spring of 2013 and was passed, with a
sunset date of June 30, 2016, in the Spring of 2014.213 The 
213. 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts 820 (expired July 1, 2016). Tennessee’s statute criminalizing in-
utero drug transmission was the first, and is, to date, the only statute enacted in the United
States explicitly criminalizing the transmission of drugs to a fetus during pregnancy. Cara
Angelotta et al., A Moral or Medical Problem? The Relationship Between Legal Penalties and
Treatment Practices for Opioid Use Disorders in Pregnant Women, 26 WOMEN’S HEALTH
ISSUES 595, 596 (2016). The Tennessee statute was in effect for just over two years, from April
28, 2014 to June 30, 2016. 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts 820. As of the date of this writing, while
similar legislation has been proposed or is under consideration, no other state has passed
legislation authorizing these prosecutions. See Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of
and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implications
for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 299, 320-21
(2013). Despite the lack of statutory authorization, prosecutors across the nation have brought
these cases by charging women with violating statutes originally intended to target crimes
against living persons, not fetuses. See id. at 321-22. For example, between 1973 and 2005 the
majority of prosecutions proceeded under the theory that the conduct constituted child abuse
or child endangerment. Id. at 321. Similarly, between 2006 and 2015, at least 479 women
were prosecuted in Alabama for “chemical endangerment,” a crime originally created to target
the harm to children who were living in houses where methamphetamine was being produced.
See Nina Martin, Take a Valium, Lose Your Kid, Go to Jail, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.propublica.org/article/when-the-womb-is-a-crime-scene [https://perma.cc/PB7W-
5WRH]. In only two states, Alabama and South Carolina, have the courts approved these
prosecutions after they were challenged. Howard, supra note 210, at 49-52. All other courts
examining the issue have concluded that these prosecutions were unlawful, generally because
the legislature that wrote the crimes in question were not thinking of crimes against a fetus
when they wrote the statute. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 213, at 320-22.
This does not, however, mean that the Tennessee prosecutions were the first to be brought,
nor does it mean that these prosecutions no longer take place. See id. at 321-22. These
prosecutions were traced back to as early as 1973. See id. at 321. Through a variety of
empirical methods, Paltrow and Flavin identified 413 cases of forced interventions of pregnant
women in these circumstances between 1973 and 2005. Id. at 304. Three hundred and fifty-
four of the cases involved criminal prosecution while the remaining involved primarily civil
legal interventions. See id. at 321-22. Prosecutions have taken place in virtually every state
in the nation. See id. at 309. Paltrow and Flavin documented prosecutions and/or other forced
interventions against pregnant women in forty-four states. See id. at 300. The only exceptions
were Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id. at 309.
Since that time over 1000 women have been prosecuted for transmitting drugs to their fetus.
I arrive at this number by pulling data from a variety of sources. First, Paltrow and Flavin
document 413 cases of forced intervention. Id. One hundred and ninety-seven of those cases
take place in regions other than the South. See id. at 309-10. As to prosecutions that took
place in the South, I am including data gathered in this study documenting 124 prosecutions
for fetal assault in Tennessee, see infra notes 259-60 and accompanying text, and prosecutions
documented by Grace Howard in two additional Southern states (182 in South Carolina and
501 in Alabama). Howard, supra note 210, at 63. This number could be an overcount in one
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way but is likely a significant undercount in many others. It could be an overcount because
the 413 forced interventions documented by Paltrow and Flavin include fifty-nine cases of civil
forced interventions, so some percentage of what I have termed “non-Southern cases” may
involve civil interventions. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra, at 311 tbl.1, 321. The number is
likely a substantial undercount, however, because not all Southern states are included in the
analysis and, far more importantly, every researcher who has attempted to gather this data
has noted the significant difficulties in finding complete data due in large part to the ways
criminal court records are kept. See infra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
One can trace prosecutions back to the 1970s and the prosecution of women for giving birth
to, what was then termed, “heroin babies.” See Paltrow & Flavin, supra, at 309, 312 fig.1.
While these early prosecutions mark the start of this phenomena, the majority of prosecutions
have come in two large waves. See Howard, supra note 210, at 28. The first began in earnest
in 1989, and targeted poor, disproportionately African American women, predominantly in
the South, who were accused of ingesting crack cocaine while pregnant. See Paltrow & Flavin,
supra, at 309-12. The second, in more recent years, was against both white and black poor
women, also predominantly in the South, for using methamphetamine, opiates, as well as
other drugs. See Howard, supra note 210, at 28, 32-38; Paltrow & Flavin, supra, at 309-12.
The first wave of prosecutions spiked between 1989 and 1991 and continued at a steady pace
through the mid-2000s. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra, at 312 fig.1. In terms of the rates of
intervention, the study identifies a handful of forced intervention cases before 1989 (generally
between one and six cases per year). See id. The numbers of cases spike between 1989 and
1991. See id. In 1989-1991 they document between thirty-six and forty-three cases per year
and then the numbers fall again and remain fairly steady between fifteen to twenty-five
documented interventions per year through the end of the study period. See id. Although the
study identifies 354 prosecutions during this period, the authors compellingly argue that,
given the extraordinary difficulty of identifying existing cases, particularly those that result
from the bringing of a charge and a subsequent guilty plea, this number represents a
substantial undercount. See id. at 304.
The prosecutions were strongly associated with the crack cocaine epidemic and were
targeted, both as a matter of empirical fact and as a matter of rhetoric, at poor African
American women giving birth to what were then termed, “crack babies.” See Howard, supra
note 210, at 28-30; Paltrow & Flavin, supra, at 333. Dorothy Roberts brought early and
important attention to these prosecutions. See Roberts, supra note 53, at 1480. At this point
there is no question that the cultural hysteria over “crack babies” was both deeply embedded
in racial stereotyping and was largely overblown by the popular press. See Howard, supra
note 210, at 29-32. Although babies born having been exposed to cocaine in-utero do manifest
some small deficits, the long-term harm appears to be minor and far less serious than the
long-term effects of in-utero exposure to alcohol and tobacco. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra, at
334.
The second wave began in the mid-2000s with the rise of methamphetamine and opiates.
See Howard, supra note 210, at 28. In this second wave the prosecutions shifted, again both
empirically and as a matter of rhetoric, to poor white women, “meth babies,” and “oxy-tots.”
See id. at 28, 32-38. The racial shifts in prosecutions of women for in-utero drug transmission
has been documented by a variety of scholars. For the period from 1973, when the Supreme
Court decided Roe v. Wade, to 2005, Lynn Paltrow and Jean Flavin issued a report
documenting “state actions taken against 413 women in forty-four states, the District of
Columbia, and some federal jurisdictions between 1973 and 2005.” Paltrow & Flavin, supra,
at 309. Paltrow and Flavin’s data reveal that, “[t]he largest percentage of cases originated in
the South (56 percent), followed by the Midwest (22 percent), the Pacific and West (15
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law that was in effect from 2014 to 2016 was, in its final form, fairly
simple. It was structured to link to Tennessee’s assault statute,
which is typical of assault statutes in that it criminalizes as a Class
A misdemeanor “[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly caus[ing]
bodily injury to another; [or] [i]ntentionally or knowingly caus[ing]
another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.”214 Instead of
risking legal challenges by bringing prosecutions under this statute
without resolving the question of whether the statutory definition
of “another” includes a fetus, the statute at issue here made this
point clear, stating that:
[N]othing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a woman
for assault under § 39-13-101 for the illegal use of a narcotic
drug ... while pregnant, if her child is born addicted to or harmed
by the narcotic drug and the addiction or harm is a result of her
illegal use of a narcotic drug taken while pregnant.215
The statute allowed a woman to raise a complete defense to
prosecution if she “actively enrolled in an addiction recovery
program before the child [was] born, remained in the program after
delivery, and successfully completed the program, regardless of
percent), and the Northeast (7 percent).” Id. These prosecutions focused almost entirely on
poor women and, among these poor women, focused disproportionately on African American
women. See id. at 300-01. In addition, whereas there were a few prosecutions in this period
involving drugs other than cocaine, the drug that was most frequently named in the cases was
cocaine. Id. at 315-16.
During the second wave of prosecutions, beginning roughly in the early 2010s, prosecutions
appear to have remained focused in the South and in poor communities, but the racial
makeup of those prosecutions began to shift from black to white. See Howard, supra note 210,
at 28. As Grace Howard has revealed in her study of prosecutions in South Carolina and
Alabama, as the targeted substances shifted from cocaine to methamphetamine and opiates,
the racial makeup of defendants shifted overall from black to white. See id. This result is
confirmed both through the data underlying this study of the Tennessee prosecutions as well
as the work of other scholars. See, e.g., id. at 91, 93. In Tennessee, for the forty-one cases
under study for this Article, all but one concerned a white defendant. See infra notes 267-69
and accompanying text. Similarly, Grace Howard has found that in South Carolina,
“[a]nnually, black defendants outnumber white defendants in South Carolina through 2003.
After 2003 the demographic composition of women arrested for pregnancy-related crimes in
the state shifted dramatically. In 2014, the ratio of white to black defendants was 16:1.”
Howard, supra note 210, at 91. Similarly, Howard finds that in “Alabama arrests
predominantly involve[ ] white women, making up 375 cases (75.9%).” Id.
214. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-101(a)(1)-(2) (2018).
215. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (2014) (expired July 1, 2016).
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whether the child was born addicted to or harmed by the narcotic
drug.”216 A prescription for the narcotics at issue was also clearly a
defense.217 Throughout the legislative record, proponents of the
legislation shifted between two primary narratives justifying the
bill.218 The first, focused both on the infants in crisis and what was
characterized as deep maternal irresponsibility.219 For example,
Terri Lynn Weaver, the original sponsor of the bill in the House,
characterized it in 2013 as a response to a form of child abuse.220
She began by noting that 111 infants had been diagnosed with NAS
that year.221 Of the mothers she stated, “[t]hese women don’t want
help; they don’t even recognize there’s life in there.... This is for
cases of women, they don’t care.”222 In the 2013 hearing, Weaver is
clear about her intent: “Let’s just focus on the children.”223 For
Weaver, the purpose of the bill was to separate the women from
their infants, and to use punishment as a means to deter future
pregnancies and save babies.224
Although the focus on the infants and NAS, as well as the
derogation of women who give birth to these children is strong
throughout the legislative record, another theme emerges over time.
This theme focuses both on the needs of the mothers and the
purported role of the prosecutions themselves in providing treat-
ment for the mothers.225 For example, Representative Hardaway
characterized the legislation as serving as a benevolent force in the
mothers’ lives: “[while] drugs tend to take your right mind away ...
[with the] discipline ... [of the] court system ... [the mothers can] go
216. Id. § 39-13-107(c)(3).
217. Id. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (“[N]othing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a woman
for assault under § 39-13-101 for the illegal use of a narcotic drug.”).
218. See Hearing on S.B. 1295 Before the H. Crim. Just. Sub-Comm., 108th Gen. Assemb.,









225. See Hearing on S.B. 1295 Before the H. Crim. Just. Sub-Comm., 108th Gen. Assemb.,
0:48:43 (Tenn. Apr. 9, 2013)[hereinafter Hearing on 1295 Before the H. Crim Just. Subcomm.
(II)], http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=269&clip_id=7751 [https://perma.cc/
5BB6-XGNK].
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back to being the nurturing caring parents that they would want to
be.”226 Similarly Amy Wyrick, the District Attorney for Shelby Coun-
ty, who at one point characterized the women she prosecuted under
the statute as “the worst of the worst” also characterized the law as
a “velvet hammer,” one that presumably used the threat of punish-
ment to gently but firmly compel women to address their ad-
dictions.227 But Wyrick assured the representatives that, “[n]one of
us care to lock up mothers who are addicted to drugs.”228
Characterizing criminal sanctions as incentivizing defendants to
cease engaging in illegal behavior and choose more positive paths is
not unusual. Nor is it at all unusual, in an era of problem-solving
courts, to characterize courts as able to use their coercive authority
to compel behavioral changes in criminal defendants as well as
others subject to the jurisdiction of various courts.229 What is un-
usual in this legislative record is the way that prosecutors and
representatives begin to frame the creation of the crime, not just as
creating an incentive for women to seek treatment, but as the
precondition to and provider of treatment itself.230 In the minds and
words of the supporters, it is the creation of the crime and the
ability to prosecute that makes treatment possible.231 This rationale
is largely centered around the close linkage between this particular
legislation and the Memphis drug court, but the linkage goes beyond
that. Over and over again, legislators and prosecutors characterize
prosecution itself as that which will provide access to treatment that
is not otherwise available to the women.232
This point bears emphasis. Whereas recent drug courts were born




229. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
230. See Hearing on 1295 Before the H. Crim Just. Subcomm. (I), supra note 218; Hearing
on 1295 Before the H. Crim Just. Subcomm. (II), supra note 225.
231. See id.
232. See Hearing on H.B. 1660 Before the H. Crim. Just. Subcomm., 109th Gen. Assemb.
(Tenn. March 15, 2016), http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=341&clip_id=
12002# [https://perma.cc/EE24-56F2]; Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm.
(I), supra note 5; Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 108th Gen. Assemb.
(Tenn. April 9, 2013) [hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (II)],
http://tnga.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=262&clip_id=7746# [https://perma.cc/8Q
A6-R2CP]; Hearing on 1295 Before the H. Crim. Just. Subcomm. (II), supra note 225.
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found themselves with courtrooms filled with individuals with
extensive needs that led to their criminal conduct,233 here something
radically different happened. In the rhetoric of the hearings jus-
tifying the passage of the statute, the “treatment” available only
through the courts is contemplated as so beneficial that it justifies
the criminalization of previously noncriminal conduct.234
The legislative record contains at least three interrelated
narratives along these lines: first, without the statute there are no
social service resources available to the women; second, criminali-
zation itself will lead to the creation of treatment resources; and
finally, the law is there to serve and enable the creation and support
of drug courts.235
In both the 2013 hearings on initial enactment and in the 2016
hearings on reauthorization, there are multiple statements sug-
gesting that the women who would be subject to prosecution could
not access treatment without being prosecuted. Perhaps most
poignant was the statement of Barry Staubus, the Sullivan County
District Attorney who spoke of his community as “drowning” and
“powerless” in the face of the prevalence of NAS.236 Staubus would
go onto lead the state in number of prosecutions per capita.237 As
quoted in the introduction to this Article, he hoped the statute
would give rise to the creation of desperately needed treatment
resources for his community.238
Similarly, in 2016 District Attorney General Amy Weirich spoke
in favor of reauthorization: “What was happening before we had this
legislation is that those babies were being taken from their mothers
and their mothers were left helpless without any chance of getting
the help they need.”239 This rhetorical framing, “before we had this
233. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 225-28.
235. See supra notes 225-34.
236. Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (I), supra note 5 (statement of
Barry Staubus, Dist. Attorney of Sullivan County).
237. Mallory Yu et al., In Tennessee, Giving Birth to a Drug-Dependent Baby Can Be a
Crime, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 18, 2015, 3:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2015/11/18/455924258/in-tennessee-giving-birth-to-a-drug-addicted-baby-can-be-a-crime
[https://perma.cc/6T6Q-BGPM] (stating that Barry Staubus prosecuted over twenty drug-
using mothers in 2015 as the district attorney for Sullivan County).
238. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
239. Hearing on H.B. 1660 Before the H. Criminal Justice Sub-Comm., supra note 232
(statement Dist. Attorney Gen. Amy Weirich).
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legislation,” clearly indicates that, in Weirich’s view, it was the
creation of the crime that led to help.240 Similarly, Representative
Lamberth stated in 2016 that “one hundred percent of the women
that were seeking drug court assistance right ... now would not be
aware of it.”241 Nowhere among the statements of proponents of the
legislation is there any suggestion that this state of affairs—the
seemingly overwhelming lack of resources available to support
pregnant women struggling with addiction—might call not for the
creation of a new crime but instead for the augmentation of com-
munity-based social support.242 Instead, in their statements, crim-
inalization and treatment are inextricably intertwined.243
Quite explicitly in the view of these proponents, if the problem is
the lack of resources for women needing help, the solution is the
creation of the crime. Senator Kelsey, a senator from Nashville,
Tennessee, described the law in 2015 as “offering their mothers the
help they so desperately need but cannot obtain on their own.”244 He
went on to say:
The other issue that this committee also needs to consider is
that these women are usually not being sent to jail at all but in
fact the beginning of the prosecution is what the court [is] able
to do to send them to drug treatment. That’s another very
important and positive aspect for the bill.245
Similarly, Senator Tate explained that “this bill what it does is gives
the DA or a judge the right or authority if you will to send a mother
of a child to a drug court.”246 This view is not restricted to legisla-
tors. Instead, for those women who desperately need treatment, it
is descriptive of the reality in their communities.
In one of the most striking moments in the hearings, Latoni
Lester, an African American woman from Memphis who was pros-
ecuted under the statute, diverted to, and graduated from the
240. See id.
241. Hearing on H.B. 1660 Before the H. Criminal Justice Sub-Comm., supra note 232
(statement of Rep. William Lamberth, Chair, H. Crim. Just. Subcomm.).
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (II), supra note 232.
245. Id. (statement of Sen. Brian Kelsey, Chair, S. Judiciary Comm.).
246. Id. (statement of Sen. Reginald Tate).
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Memphis Drug Court, testified in favor of reauthorization.247 During
the hearing, Representative William Lamberth asked Ms. Lester if
“[w]ithout a statute on the books ... would you have gotten the help
that you are getting right now?”248 She responded, “No, I am very
thankful for the program.”249 Clearly for Ms. Lester, no help was
available to her before she was prosecuted.250
Finally, revealing what some imply was the real justification for
the statute—namely filling the seats of drug courts throughout the
state—Senator Finney, from Jackson, Tennessee, talked about the
potential benefits to his district with the creation of this crime: “we
have a great drug court in Jackson ... and I’m sure it would benefit
from something like this.”251 At this point, it should be clear that a
central rationale for the creation of this crime was the ability to use
prosecution as a mechanism to create and help women access
treatment resources.
The Sections that follow now turn to data collected on the
prosecutions of women for fetal assault in Tennessee.252 This data
reveals two important points. First, the prosecutions focused almost
exclusively on poor women. In addition, in the vast majority of
prosecutions that took place in rural, Appalachian, eastern Tennes-
see, the criminal court files reveal two related phenomena about the
relationship between care and punishment. One, presumptions of
confidentiality in health care settings were significantly compro-
mised in these cases, raising serious questions about the effects of
punishment on the quality of care in those settings.253 Turning to
the criminal system setting, the case files reveal significant pun-
ishment with either no access to treatment (in the majority of cases)
or access to treatment linked strongly to significant punishment
247. Hearing on H.B. 1660 Before the H. Criminal Justice Sub-Comm., supra note 232




251. Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (I), supra note 5 (statement of
Sen. Lowe Finney).
252. [EDITOR'S NOTE: Due to privacy concerns and Institutional Review Board rules,
Professor Bach was unable to share the court records, medical records, and interview
transcripts referenced in the following Sections with the editors of the William & Mary Law
Review. The editors were unable to independently verify the information contained in these
sources. The records and transcripts of the interviews are on file with the author.]
253. See infra Part III.D.
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with very little access to treatment.254 If the justification for the
statute was using the mechanisms of prosecution to link women to
care, this data raises serious questions about the success of those ef-
forts. Further, as Part IV argues, to the extent that this case study
is indicative of the implications of the collapse of boundaries be-
tween support systems and punitive systems, this data suggests
that we must delink these systems and devote resources to auton-
omy-enhancing, community-based social welfare support.
B. Prosecuting Poverty: The Tennessee Cases
There is no question that those who sought passage of Tennes-
see’s fetal assault law were seeking a way to address the high rates
of NAS.255 Whether it be a “velvet hammer” to compel individual
women to address their addiction,256 a means to take advantage of
the resources of problem-solving courts,257 or a strong message
designed to deter other women,258 the law was justified in large part
as a way to address this public health problem. What actually
happened in Appalachia, however, tells quite a different story.
Over the course of nearly two years, working with a team of
research assistants, I gathered criminal court259 records document-
ing the cases of approximately 124 women who were prosecuted for
this offense.260 In addition, I requested and received the birth
254. See infra Part III.D.
255. See supra notes 213-24 and accompanying text..
256. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
259. I use the term “criminal court” generically here to refer to the courts in which the
charges against these women were brought. As detailed below, in Tennessee misdemeanor
prosecutions are generally initiated in lower courts, called General Sessions Courts, only
proceeding to the Tennessee “criminal court” in certain circumstances. See infra notes 295-302
and accompanying text.
260. To gather this information, the research team on this project sent requests pursuant
to the Tennessee Open Records Act to every prosecution office, police agency, and court in the
State of Tennessee that would have records of any prosecution. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10-7-501-
516 (2018). We followed up on those requests by letter and phone on multiple occasions.
Ultimately, we gathered information documenting the existence of 124 women who were
prosecuted for this crime between April 28, 2014 and June 30, 2016. As there is no central
database recording prosecutions, this project was reliant on the compliance of individuals in
those offices to have kept records and then provide them in response to our requests. There
is no way to guarantee that this is an accurate count of the number of prosecutions. In fact,
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records of every infant born and subsequently diagnosed with NAS
during the time when the law was in effect. These two sets of data
reveal significant information about what actually occurred during
the period when this law was in effect.
After the initial round of data collection, it became clear that
many prosecutors across the state, particularly in three of the four
larger cities, chose not to prosecute this crime and many other dis-
tricts in the western half of the state brought very few prosecutions.
Prosecutions concentrated in one geographic region. To understand
this information, one has to know just a little about Tennessee ge-
ography. Tennessee is long and thin, stretching from the eastern
Appalachian region at the borders of North Carolina and Kentucky,
through Nashville to just north of Alabama and all the way west to
Memphis, which is north of Mississippi.261 There are three major
cities—Knoxville in the east, Nashville in the middle, and Memphis
in the west.262 Geographically, the eastern half of Tennessee is in
the largely economically distressed regions of Appalachia.263 While
it is likely an undercount to some degree. See, e.g., Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 213, at 304
(explaining why the authors believe their study of 413 cases constitutes an undercount).
Nevertheless, this number of prosecutions closely matches the number of cases that District
Attorneys reportedly brought against women for this crime. Data on file with author. These
prosecutions focused in two geographic areas: rural Eastern Appalachia and Memphis,
Tennessee. In the second phase of data gathering, we collected the full court records for
women who were prosecuted in several specific judicial districts in the Eastern Appalachian
region of the state through additional requests by email, letter, and phone, as much as
possible. The data collection for the files in six judicial districts Eastern Tennessee is com-
plete, and the data collection is still in progress for the additional eastern districts as well as
the Memphis cases. Id. For this reason, and because of the significant differences between the
criminal systems in Appalachia and Memphis, this Article focuses on only forty-one Ap-
palachian cases for which we have full information. The relevant courts do not keep data in
a centralized manner and, as a result, we do not have consistent data for each woman.
Nevertheless, these court files draw a fairly clear picture of the trajectories of prosecution in
the eastern districts that chose to bring these cases.
261. Sarah McCantess Howell et al., Tennessee, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Tennessee#ref276556 [https://perma.cc/B9P2-ACHY].
262. Id.
263. Appalachia is defined, by the national legislation creating the Appalachian Regional
Commission as, “a 205,000-square-mile region that follows the spine of the Appalachian
Mountains from southern New York to northern Mississippi.” The Appalachian Region,
APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION, https://www.arc.gov/appalachian_region/The
AppalachianRegion.asp [https://perma.cc/B4SJ-2A25]. Appalachia “includes all of West
Virginia and parts of 12 other states: Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
Forty-two percent of the Region’s population is rural, compared with 20 percent of the
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the vast majority of those in the east are white,264 and the areas are
predominantly rural, Memphis is a majority black city and is far
more densely populated, along with Knoxville and Nashville.265 The
majority of prosecutions took place in the Eastern, predominantly
rural areas of Appalachia. Forty-one of these cases are the focus of
this Part.266 These case files reveal a complex story about what
national population.” Id. While not all of Appalachia is economically distressed, the majority
of counties in Appalachian Tennessee are classified as either economically “distressed” or
economically “at risk.” APPALACHIAN REG’L COMM’N, COUNTY ECONOMIC STATUS AND NUMBER
OF DISTRESSED AREAS IN APPALACHIAN TENNESSEE, FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2015) [hereinafter
COUNTY ECONOMIC STATUS], http://www.arc.gov/images/appregion/economic_statusFY2016/
CountyEconomicStatusandDistressAreasFY2016Tennessee.pdf [https://perma.cc/66H7-YT
NH]. To determine these classifications, the Commission averages, for each year and each
county, the unemployment rate, per capita market income, and the poverty rate and then
compares this to the national averages. Source & Methodology: Distressed Designation and
County Economic Status Classification System, FY 2007-FY 2018, APPALACHIAN REGIONAL
COMMISSION, https://www.arc.gov/research/sourceandmethodologycountyeconomicstatusfy
2007fy2018.asp [https://perma.cc/P8X6-Y4XY]. Counties are classified as “distressed” when
they fall into the bottom ten percent of counties by these measures. Id. Counties are classified
as “at risk” if they fall between ten percent and 25 percent when compared to national aver-
ages and “transitional” if they fall between 25 percent and 75 percent of national averages.
Id. The majority of Appalachian counties in Tennessee are classified as either distressed or
at risk, but some are classified as transitional. COUNTY ECONOMIC STATUS, supra. The ma-
jority of at risk and transitional counties have census tracts within them that fall into the
distressed classification. Id. Note that this Article pulled data from fiscal year 2016, the only
full year during which the prosecutions took place.
264. For example, Sullivan County, Tennessee, the district in the far northeast of the state
and in which 31 prosecutions took place, is 95.1 percebt white in the 2016 census. QuickFacts:
Sullivan County, Tennessee; Shelby County, Tennessee; Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July
1, 2017) [hereinafter QuickFacts: Sullivan County], https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/
table/sullivancountytennessee,shelbycountytennessee,tn/PST045217 [https://perma.cc/9B3J-
5KPV]. Shelby County, Tennessee, in the far west of the state was 54.1 percent Black or
African American. Id.
265. QuickFacts: Memphis City, Tennessee; United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1,
2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/memphiscitytennessee,US/PST045217
[https://perma.cc/X6FE-GZVY]. Sullivan County has a population of 379.4 persons per square
mile in contrast to Shelby County, which has a population of 1,215.5 persons per square mile.
See QuickFacts: Sullivan County, supra note 264.
266. There is a numerical difference between the number of cases in this region for which
we have files and the full number of relevant prosecutions. In the area under study for this
Article, we documented sixty-eight individual prosecutions. Of the sixty-eight, twenty of the
files were either missing or had been expunged. The courts, police agencies, and prosecutors
affirmed that the prosecutions had taken place but could not provide any information about
the identity of the women or the cases. For seven additional cases, we were given the names
of the women prosecuted but no additional information or documentation. We received court
files for the remaining forty-one women who are the focus of this Article.
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actually happened, who was targeted, and what it meant to be tar-
geted for this crime.
The first striking fact confirms larger national data, showing the
shift in the overall racial makeup of these prosecutions.267 Of the
forty-one women who are the focus of this Article and who were all
prosecuted in judicial districts in the Appalachian regions of eastern
Tennessee, all but one woman was white.268
The second striking fact is that all available evidence suggests
that the vast majority of the women who were prosecuted were poor.
To determine the economic characteristics of the women who were
prosecuted, I relied on several indications in the court files as well
as birth record data. A woman was classified as low income if one or
more of three indicators appeared in the criminal court files: she
was listed as unemployed; she was listed as homeless; or there was
some indication that the court had determined her as indigent and
therefore entitled to appointed counsel. A woman was also classified
as low income if her infant’s birth record data listed her household
as having an income under $25,000 per year or if more than 50
percent of those residing in her census tract lived below the poverty
line. For nine of the forty-one cases, the woman did not live in a
census tract with more than 50 percent of its residents below the
poverty line and neither her child’s birth record nor the criminal
court files gave any indication of her income status. Despite this,
given the overall demographics of these courts, these women too
were likely indigent.
These data, and their implications, bear repeating. If this
legislation was designed, as its proponents expressed, as a way to
use the mechanisms of the criminal legal system to address the
healthcare needs and behavior of women giving birth to infants with
NAS, or, to draw from the legislative testimony, to address the flood
of babies,269 this was a public health solution targeted not at all
women but nearly exclusively at poor women. The next Part of this
Article takes this premise as a given and begins to ask what
267. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
268. For one woman, race was marked as A, presumably indicating that the woman was
Asian American. All others were marked W for white.
269. See supra Part III.A.
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actually happened to the white, low-income women prosecuted for
fetal assault in the Eastern Appalachian regions of Tennessee.270
To begin to paint this picture, the following Section turns to the
basic legal and institutional frameworks of the various local systems
involved in these cases and to what the criminal court files tell us
about what happened to the low-income white women who were
prosecuted for this offense.
C. Three Intersecting Legal Systems at Play
As a general rule, the information that would lead to prosecution
for fetal assault flowed through three separate systems. In the vast
majority of cases, the initial information was gathered by hospital
staff (doctors, nurses, and social workers). A report was then made
by someone at the hospital to the Department of Children’s Services.
Prosecution was then initiated, based on both the hospital records
and reports as well as data gathered and provided by child welfare
officials to police and prosecutors. Therefore, to understand the
prosecutions one needs to understand components of and interac-
tions between the healthcare system, the child welfare system, and
the criminal system.271 
1. The Healthcare System
The healthcare system’s role in these prosecutions comes into
play predominantly when professionals within that system disclose
information about their patients (both mothers and infants) to child
welfare officials, police, and prosecutors. While these disclosures are
legally authorized under limited circumstances, as a general rule,
medical records are confidential.272 These privacy protections are de-
signed to encourage honest communication between care providers
and their patients. The principal federal legal protection creating
270. The fact that these prosecutions targeted poor white women while earlier prosecutions
for similar offenses in other jurisdictions targeted poor black women, see Howard, supra note
210, at 28-32, gives rise to a set of very important questions that will be explored in later work
arising from this study.
271. For an extensive discussion of how these systems interact to impose harm
disproportionately in poor, African American communities, see generally Bach, supra note 34.
272. See infra notes 273-82 and accompanying text.
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this confidentiality is the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA).273 As a general rule, HIPAA protects
the confidentiality of what it defines as “protected health informa-
tion,” which includes, among other things, both medical records and
statements made to medical personnel during the course of treat-
ment.274
However, HIPAA, state, and federal law concerning child abuse
significantly limit these protections for individuals suspected of
child abuse.275 HIPAA authorizes the disclosure of protected health
information in two circumstances relevant to these cases. Such
information can be disclosed to “[a] public health authority or other
appropriate government authority authorized by law to receive
reports of child abuse or neglect.”276 In addition, providers can dis-
close to a government authority information about an individual
that the healthcare provider “reasonably believes to be a victim of
abuse, neglect, or domestic violence.”277 Moreover, like all states,
Tennessee law requires health care providers to report suspected
cases of abuse or neglect.278 This overall legislative schema carves
out specific exemptions that allow healthcare providers to disclose
both suspected cases of child abuse, and to share the medical in-
formation of potential victims of abuse.
Adding to these legal mechanisms permitting disclosure in these
circumstances, the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA), which provides a significant amount of funding to
state child welfare programs, imposes specific requirements as a
273. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2012).
274. HIPAA extends these protections to what it defines as “protected health information.”
Id. The term “health information” is defined as 
any information, including genetic information, whether oral or recorded in any
form or medium, that: (1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health
plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or
health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical
or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an
individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health
care to an individual.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017). “Protected health information” is defined as “individually
identifiable health information.” Id.
275. See infra notes 276-82 and accompanying text.
276. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(ii).
277. Id. § 164.512(c)(1).
278. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2018). Indeed, Tennessee’s law is unusually broad in
that it requires “any person” to make sure to report. Id. (emphasis added).
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condition of receiving federal funds.279 In order to receive CAPTA
funds, each state must submit a plan for the administration of its
CAPTA program that complies with a variety of federal require-
ments.280 Among other conditions, states must put in place
policies and procedures ... to address the needs of infants born
with and identified as being affected by substance abuse ...
including a requirement that health care providers involved in
the delivery or care of such infants notify the child protective
services system of the occurrence of such condition in such
infants.281
When taken together, these provisions allow hospital personnel to
disclose to both DCS and police medical information about both
mothers who they suspect took drugs while pregnant and about
infants who are adversely effected by that exposure.282 Thus, when
women who have used narcotics during pregnancy enter the hos-
pital to give birth, their privacy is already severely compromised.
2. The Child Welfare System
In Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services,
or DCS, administers the child welfare system.283 DCS has a variety
of responsibilities when it comes to the protection of children who
have been reported to the agency as potential victims of abuse or
neglect.284 When a case is called in to the Tennessee child abuse
hotline, it is classified into one of two categories: assessment or
investigation.285 While the classification of a case as “assessment”
279. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) State Grants, CHILD. BUREAU,
ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (May 17, 2012), www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/resource/capta-
state-grants [https://perma.cc/2DZ2-MC9S].
280. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(1) (2018). This requirement was added to CAPTA as a result of
the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36, 117 Stat. 800, 800-31
(2003).
281.  § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii).
282. See Bach, supra note 34, at 349.
283. About Us, TENN. DEP’T CHILD. SERV., https://www.tn.gov/dcs/about-us.html [https://
perma.cc/4ACA-UX2N].
284. See id.
285. See Tennessee Child Abuse Hotline FAQ, TENN. DEP’T CHILD. SERV., https://www.tn.
gov/dcs/program-areas/child-safety/reporting/hotline-faq.html [https://perma.cc/DP59-DUGV].
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covers the vast majority of cases, the designation “investigation” is
reserved for cases classified by the agency as “severe abuse.286 Three
categories of cases fall into this classification under the statute: sex-
ual and trafficking abuse, abuse resulting in death/near-death, and
exposing infants to environments where drugs are being manufac-
tured. However, under agency policies, the presence of an NAS di-
agnosis leads to a classification of “severe abuse.”287
The classification of a case as “severe child abuse”288 has several
related implications. First, the classification indicates that the
abuse might lead not just to child welfare intervention by DCS but
also to prosecution of the parent.289 Because the cases are considered
more severe and because they might involve criminal investigation
and prosecution, a severe abuse classification triggers the conven-
ing of what in Tennessee is called a Child Protective Investigative
Team (CPIT), in which information is shared among the team
participants.290 That team is made up both of DCS officials,
prosecutors, police, and various other mandated participants.291
After preliminary investigation, the team makes a variety of de-
cisions concerning the child welfare case itself.292 In this category
falls, among many other issues, decisions as to whether the child
will remain in the home or be removed, any services to be offered or
286. Interview with Travis Bishop, Supervisor, Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services, Knox Region (May 30, 2018) (transcript on file with author). In Tennessee, the
courts have made clear that prenatal substance abuse may constitute severe child abuse for
the purpose of termination of parental rights. See In re B.A.C., 317 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2009).
287. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b)(27) (2018); interview with Travis Bishop, supra
note 286.
288. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b)(27).
289. Interview with Travis Bishop, supra note 286. It is notable that a NAS diagnosis is
still considered severe abuse even after the Tennessee statute explicitly criminalizing this
conduct is no longer law. When asked about this Mr. Bishop explained that prosecutions are
no longer recommended but that the police and DCS officials continue to collaborate, sharing,
for example, evidence discovered by DCS of other drug crimes. Id.
290. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-607(b)(1).
291. Id. § 37-1-607(a)(3) (“It is the intent of the general assembly that the child protective
investigations be conducted by the team members in a manner that not only protects the child
but that also preserves any evidence for future criminal prosecutions. It is essential, therefore,
that all phases of the child protective investigation be appropriately conducted and that fur-
ther investigations, as appropriate, be properly conducted and coordinated.”); Administrative
Policies and Procedures 14.6, TENN. DEP'T CHILD. SERV., https://files.dcs.tn.gov/policies/chap
14/14.6.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU4N-6YPP].
292. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-607(b)(2).
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required, whether the agency will plan for return of the child to the
home, and what the parents or guardians must do to facilitate this
return.293 In addition, the CPIT will make a recommendation to the
Attorney General’s office as to whether it should prosecute the
parent.294 While other allegations of abuse could, in particular cir-
cumstances, lead DCS to involve police and prosecution in its cases,
it is only in the CPIT context that this participation is mandated by
DCS procedures.
3. Police, Prosecution, and Courts
Once the Attorney General’s office determines that a woman
should be prosecuted, the case proceeds into the criminal system.295
Every county in the state has a lower level court, called the General
Sessions Court, in which misdemeanor prosecutions are generally
initiated.296 The General Sessions Court is a court of limited juris-
diction that can conduct preliminary hearings, enter judgment after
a plea agreement, and monitor those under sentence in the court.297
A defendant who wishes not to plead in General Sessions Court can
either have a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is
probable cause to proceed or can waive that hearing.298 If the court
finds there is probable cause or if the defendant waives the hearing,
the case is “bound over” to a higher court, either Criminal Court or
Circuit Court, depending on the judicial district in which the
Sessions Court is located.299 As is the case nationally, the vast
293. See id.
294. See id. § 37-1-607(b)(5); see also Administrative Policies and Procedures 14.6, supra
note 291.
295. See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (“If the affidavit of complaint and any supporting affidavits
filed with it establish that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate or clerk shall issue an
arrest warrant to an officer authorized by law to execute it or shall issue a criminal summons
for the appearance of the defendant.”).
296. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-501(a)-(b).
297. See id. § 16-15-501(d)(1).
298. See generally TENN. R. CRIM. P. 5.1.
299. When probable cause is found, “the magistrate shall bind the defendant over to the
grand jury and either release the defendant pursuant to applicable law or commit the
defendant to jail by a written order.” Id.; see also TENN. R. CRIM. P. 9(a) (stating that when the
grand jury returns an indictment or presentment, a capias or criminal summons will issue).
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majority of misdemeanor defendants plead guilty.300 In Tennessee,
those pleas are generally entered in, and sentences are supervised
by, General Sessions Court.301 General Sessions Courts are autho-
rized to, and often required to, charge a variety of fees and costs,
and have the full power to impose lawful sentences on defendants
who plead guilty in their courts or who are found guilty of violating
some condition of sentencing.302
A common outcome for individuals charged with a misdemeanor
is the imposition of a jail sentence “suspended” to a probationary
term.303 Such a person is sentenced to a prison sentence, for example
a maximum misdemeanor sentence of eleven months and twenty-
nine days of incarceration, but that sentence is suspended for the
person to complete probation in the community.304 Depending on the
county, either county employees or private probation companies
under contract with the court system supervise probation.305 A
300. In 2012, 97 percent of federal cases and 94 percent of state cases ended in plea
bargains, with defendants pleading guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence. Erica Goode,
Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2012), https://
www.nytimes/com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html
[https://perma.cc/92YC-KXV5]. This number has increased in most states since that time. In
2017, 98 percent of felony arrests in New York ended in plea bargains. Gaby Del Valle, Most
Criminal Cases End in Plea Bargains, Not Trials, OUTLINE (Aug. 7, 2017) (citing Beth
Schwartzapfel, Defendants Kept in the Dark About Evidence, Until It’s Too Late, N.Y. TIMES




301. “At the General Sessions level, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor has the op-
tion [to] plead guilty to the charges.” Criminal Justice 101, OFF. DISTRICT ATT’Y GEN. FOR
KNOX COUNTY, TENN., https://www.knoxcounty.org/dag/resources/index.php [https://perma.cc/
VSV6-BHVQ]. The judgment and sentence associated with a plea is determined when the plea
is accepted. See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)-(5) (outlining the possible actions of the court in
accepting a plea deal).
302. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-21-401(f)-(g) (2018) (describing the various costs that can
be taxed by a general sessions court); see also TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)-(5).
303. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-303(c)(1) (“If the court determines that a period of
probation is appropriate, the court shall sentence the defendant to a specific sentence but
shall suspend the execution of all or part of the sentence and place the defendant on
supervised or unsupervised probation either immediately or after a period of confinement for
a period of time no less than the minimum sentence allowed under the classification.”).
304. Id.
305. See id. § 40-35-303(k) (“The commissioner of correction, sheriff, warden, superinten-
dent or other official having authority and responsibility for convicted defendants may con-
tract with any appropriate public or private agency not under the commissioner’s, sheriff ’s,
warden’s, superintendent’s or other official’s control for custody, care, subsistence, education,
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failure to comply with probationary terms, which often include the
payment of costs and fines, can result in a charge of “violation of
probation.”306
If the defendant is found guilty of a violation, he or she can have
probation “revoke[d]” at which point he or she must often serve
some or all of the previously imposed jail time.307 These charges of
violation and the accompanying jail time arise from a failure to
comply with a particular probationary requirement, for example
making a payment, showing up for an appointment, or passing a
drug test.308 In addition, because it is always a requirement of
probation not to commit additional crimes, a violation of probation
can be filed if there is a new allegation of criminal conduct during
the probationary period.309 Put differently, once a person is on
probation and engages in criminal conduct, he or she can receive not
one but two charges—one for violation of probation and one for the
new conduct. If convicted, the person then faces two jail sen-
tences—the jail term of the original offense and jail time on the new
offense.310 For example, if a defendant is on probation for a misde-
meanor and receives a suspended sentence of eleven months and
twenty-nine days and then pleads guilty to (or is found guilty of)
treatment or training of the defendants. The cost of the contract services shall be paid by the
appropriate state or local entity to the department or the local jail or workhouse.”).
306. See id. § 40-35-311(a)-(b) (“Whenever it comes to the attention of the trial judge that
any defendant who has been released upon suspension of sentence has been guilty of any
breach of the laws of this state or has violated the conditions of probation, the trial judge shall
have the power to cause to be issued under the trial judge’s hand a warrant for the arrest of
the defendant as in any other criminal case.”).
307. See id. § 40-35-311(e)(1)(A)-(B) (explaining the two alternatives a trial judge is
statutorily bound to follow when a violation of probation is found).
308. See id. §§ 40-35-303(d)-(i).
309. Id. § 40-35-311(e)(1) (“If the trial judge finds that the defendant has violated the
conditions of probation and suspension by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial judge
shall have the right by order duly entered upon the minutes of the court to revoke the
probation and suspension of sentence.”).
310. “If, while on probation, the defendant is given a jail sentence for a new case to run
consecutively to the probated case, that sentence tolls the probationary period until he is
released from parole expiration on the intervening sentence. Then his probation starts
running again.” Chris Craft, Alternative Sentencing: Probation, Community Corrections,
Diversion, Modification and Revocation, TENN. JUD. ACAD. (Aug. 21, 2014) (citing State v.
Malone, 928 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)), http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/what_every_judge_should_know_about_criminal_law-ppt__handouts.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8G2E-QAAY].
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another class A misdemeanor, the resulting sentence could be up to
twenty-two months and fifty-eight days of jail time.311
For those readers not familiar with U.S. criminal systems,
another important piece to understand is the use of jail and bail
during the course of these cases. Courts often jail misdemeanor
defendants at the initiation of the prosecution.312 Within fourteen
days of that jailing, a court official generally makes one of three
determinations.313 First, the court official can release a person upon
a promise to return to court.314 Second, that official, who is some-
times, but not always, a judge, can impose bail allowing the de-
fendant to deposit money with the court in order to be released.315
Finally, the official can decide to hold the person without bail, in
which case the defendant will remain in jail until the charges
resolve.316 If bail is set, the vast majority of defendants pay, if they
can, through the use of a private bonding company.317 The individual
generally must deposit 10 percent of the bail amount and the
company will guarantee the rest.318
The significance of the bail system is difficult to overstate,
particularly for poor defendants who are eligible to receive a
probationary sentence. For those defendants, a plea agreement is,
without question, the quickest way to get out of jail and back to the
311. The resulting sentence being a combination of the two eleven month, twenty-nine-day
misdemeanor maximums.
312. See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(b).
313. See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 5(c)(1)(B) (“The magistrate shall schedule a preliminary hearing
to be held within fourteen days if the defendant remains in custody.”); see also 8 TENNESSEE
JURISPRUDENCE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. § 20 (2018).
314. See 8 TENNESSEE JURISPRUDENCE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20; see also David M.
Reutter & Mel Motel, Bail Bond Companies Profit While Poorest Defendants Remain in Jail,
JUST POL’Y INST.: JUST. POL’Y BLOG (Sept. 26, 2012), http://blog.justicepolicy.org/2012/09/bail-
bond-companies-profit-while.html [https://perma.cc/CN77-4F3S] (“Most defendants were
released through publicly-funded pretrial services that granted release on personal
recognizance based on a promise to appear at future court dates.”).
315. 8 TENNESSEE JURISPRUDENCE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18 (“[I]f it appears that an
offense has been committed and there is probable cause to believe the defendant guilty
thereof, the accused must be committed to jail or admitted to bail to await the action of the
grand jury.”).
316. Id. § 20.
317. See Reutter & Motel, supra note 314.
318. See id. (“[F]or every detainee released through a pretrial release program, that’s one
less potential fee available to bondsmen, who usually collect 10 percent of the full bond
amount from their paying customers.”).
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community.319 If you cannot make bail, and you refuse to plead in
General Sessions Court, you will sit in jail for weeks or months
while your case is bound over to a higher court, and if you then
choose to litigate in that court, you can easily sit in jail for many
more months before hearings and trial in your case.320 For defen-
dants facing more serious charges, who may have no hope of a
nonjail sentence, the bail system plays a different role, but for those
who could receive probation, the pressure the bail system creates to
plead is extraordinary.321
D. Tracing the Cases
The cases of the low-income, white women prosecuted in Eastern
Tennessee play out within these basic structures. For this Article,
I examined the court files of forty-one women prosecuted in the
Appalachian regions of East Tennessee, all of whom were prose-
cuted for this crime.322 As noted above, all but one of these women
are white, and all of the women for whom their court files or birth
records indicated their income level were poor.323 In analyzing these
case files, I was seeking to answer several questions concerning the
role of care and its relationship to criminal prosecution. First, what
was the role of healthcare providers in the prosecutions and how
might that role have affected the care women received during their
pregnancies? Second, what might we learn about the relationship
between prosecution and care if we look at the cases through the
lens of the articulated intention to use the law to provide treatment
to women giving birth to infants with NAS?
As to the first question, the criminal court files reveal that the
vast majority of prosecutions relied heavily on information gathered
319. See id. (“Defendants who can afford to pay a bonding company are released from jail,
while poor defendants who cannot remain behind bars—sometimes for months or years while
awaiting trial.”).
320. See id.
321. See id.; see also Replacing Bail with an Algorithm, ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2017), https://
www.economist.com/news/united-states/21731631-new-jersey-has-bold-experiment-reduce-
number-people-jail-awaiting [https://perma.cc/HM3G-X38Q] (detailing the ways in which the
commercial bail industry has impacted defendants of various socioeconomic backgrounds and
has rooted itself in the justice system).
322. Please note that throughout this Section of the Article women are referred to by
pseudonyms assigned to each file during the research process.
323. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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by hospital personnel in the hospital setting and that these
disclosures, while arguably lawful, conflicted with fundamental
tenets of confidentiality that underlie the relationship between
patients and care providers.324 As to the second large ques-
tion—what of the supposition that these prosecutions were a “velvet
hammer” leading to care—one can break the evidence in the files
down into three basic categories: (1) those in which there is evidence
of an offer of or provision of treatment as part of the criminal case,
(2) those that indicate that the woman accessed treatment outside
the criminal case, and (3) those in which there is no such
evidence.325 The majority fall into the last group and, in those files
it is clear that the criminal cases were entirely about punishment,
as that punishment plays out in the lower criminal courts all over
the nation.326 For the minority who did receive some offers of care as
part of their criminal case, these offers came at a very high punitive
price.327
1. The Role of Hospitals and Hospital Personnel in Prosecutions
A central contention of those who opposed the passage of the fetal
assault law was that prosecuting women for conduct that harmed
their fetus would deter women from seeking both prenatal care and
substance abuse treatment.328 The advocates certainly had history
on their side in that fear. South Carolina is one of now only two
states in which the state high court has held that a fetus is a person
for the purposes of prosecutions against pregnant women for the
ingestion of drugs while pregnant.329 The impact of that court
decision on pregnant women’s utilization of drug treatment
programs was clear. In the year following a decision by the South
Carolina Supreme Court to treat a viable fetus as a “child” for the
purposes of South Carolina’s child abuse and endangerment
324. See infra Part III.D.1.
325. See infra Part III.D.2.
326. See Part III.D.2.
327. See infra Part III.D.3.
328. See Alexa Kolbi-Molinas, What's Next? Prosecuting a Pregnant Woman for Working
Full Time?, ACLU: SPEAK FREELY BLOG (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/
whats-next-prosecuting-pregnant-woman-working-full-time [https://perma.cc/5NFB-S58A].
329. See Howard, supra note 210, at 46, 48-50.
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statute,330 “drug treatment programs in the state experienced as
much as an 80% decline in admissions of pregnant women.”331 This
history appears to have been repeated in a different form in
Tennessee.
In the eastern part of the state, East Tennessee Children’s
Hospital is a major care provider for infants with more serious
forms of NAS, providing what many consider to be the highest
standard of care.332 That hospital tracked the number of admitted
infants with NAS who had no prenatal care before and after the im-
plementation of the fetal assault law.333 Their results, while based
on very small numbers, are quite disturbing. In the quarter before
the law passed, only one infant diagnosed with NAS had no prenatal
care.334 Two quarters later, in the last three months of 2014, six
infants with NAS had had no prenatal care.335 While the number
went down to three in the first quarter of 2015 it rose again over the
next several quarters, from seven, to seventeen and sixteen infants
in the last two quarters of 2015.336 This provides some evidence that
the fears of advocates were well-founded.
Examining the criminal case files sheds some light on why women
might have feared that seeking care could lead not to care but to
punishment. The forty-one women who are the focus of this Section
almost without exception received medical care during or after the
birth of their child at a local hospital. A few appear to have tried to
avoid hospital care altogether. For example, Lacy Wilder, a low-
income white woman, gave birth to her son in a toilet in her home.
It was only after the birth of the child that she and her son were
330. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997).
331. Cynthia Dailard & Elizabeth Nash, State Responses to Substance Abuse Among Preg-
nant Women, GUTTMACHER REP. PUB. POL’Y (2000), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/6/
gr030603.html [https://perma.cc/KRD3-5G3E].
332. See Neonatal Intensive Care in East Tennessee, E. TENN. CHILD. HOSP., https://www.
etch.com/Specialties/Neonatal-Intensive-Care.aspx [https://perma.cc/3ELJ-7LRB].





336. Id.; see also Paul C. Erwin et al., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome in East Tennessee:
Characteristics and Risk Factors Among Mothers and Infants in One Area of Appalachia, 28
J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 1393, 1404 (2017).
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transported to a hospital for care. Several other women in the study
gave birth to their infants in cars.
What is perhaps most striking about the court files and their
relationship to care is the overwhelming presence of what might
generally be assumed to be confidential medical information in the
files. As noted above, the law provides extensive protections against
the use of confidential medical information in the prosecution of a
crime but carves out exceptions in cases of potential abuse.337 Each
criminal case is initiated through a charging document that pro-
vides a factual basis for the prosecution.338 In order to bring charges,
the state must allege conduct that, if proven, would allow for a
conviction of the offense.339 In all forty-one cases, the facts alleged
were collected, at least in part, in the hospital setting. The files
contain references to drug test results of the mother, the umbilical
cord, and the infant; statements made by women to doctors and
nurses about drug use; and symptoms exhibited by the infants. The
case of Dana Mitchell is typical. The Affidavit of Complaint un-
derlying her charges alleges that:
[Dana Mitchell] gave birth to a baby girl ... [at X Medical
Center]. Upon admission [Dana’s] UDS (urine drug screen)
tested positive for THC and Opiates. It is reported that during
her prenatal care [Dana] tested positive for THC. Opiates and
Benzodiazepines and counseled for her drug use by the OBGYN.
Baby ... was born at 39 weeks with a weight of 6 lbs 9 oz. [the
infant] was showing signs of withdrawal. The cord state of [the
infant] came back positive for THC and Opiates (Hydrocodone
and Oxycodone).
This particular affidavit then goes on to detail additional facts
provided to the police by the DCS investigator assigned to the case.
Similarly, the Affidavit of Complaint in Vanessa Thomas’s case
states that:
On the above date [an infant] was born at [a hospital] with the
defendant being the mother of the child. Upon admission to the
hospital [Vanessa Thomas] told staff that she had been taking
337. See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
338. See TENN. R. CRIM. P. 3.
339. See id.
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suboxone that she did not have a prescription [stet]. She did test
positive for suboxone ... The umbilical cord came back testing
positive for suboxone. The child was transported to [another
hospital] because of the high levels on its Finnegan score, and
the child had neonatal abstinence syndrome. Some of the
symptoms was excessive crying, swelling, sneezing, nasal
stuffiness, milk tremors, sleeps less than one hour after feeds.
On [x date the hospital] reported that the Finnegan score was up
to 15.
While these disclosures are arguably legal under the various
exceptions to HIPAA outlined above,340 the affidavits raise serious
questions about how the confidentiality exceptions might be subtly
or not-so-subtly affecting the relationships of trust between patients
and providers that are so essential to the provision of care. The
conversations that led to these disclosures were no doubt in large
part essential to providing care to the women and their infants.
Making sure, for example, that the treating professionals know that
a pregnant woman ingested particular substances during pregnancy
is no doubt important to the health of both mother and child. The
general presumptions of confidentiality and trust encourage pa-
tients to disclose what can be embarrassing and potentially legally-
compromising information to their caretakers.341 But, one has to
wonder whether the patients who were participating in these
conversations presumed that the information was confidential. One
has to wonder further how women reacted and how word spread
once it became clear that their doctors and nurses were the main
source of information leading to prosecution. The number of women
who gave birth outside a hospital setting in the sample as well as
the declining use of prenatal care suggests that this vulnerability to
reporting may well have added to women’s fears.
Going even further, it is not entirely clear whether the healthcare
providers were viewing their role solely through the lens of medical
care or whether, at certain crucial moments, they also viewed
themselves and conducted themselves as an arm of the police. Take
for example Vanessa Thomas’s case described above. Ms. Thomas
340. See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
341. Confidentiality, Patient/Physician, AM. ACAD. FAM. PHYSICIANS (Dec. 2017), https://
www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/patient-confidentiality.html [https://perma.cc/PK6V-RKMG].
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apparently disclosed to her care provider that she took Suboxone, a
prescription medication, during her pregnancy and she did not have
a prescription for that medication. Suboxone is the brand name for
an opiate (buprenorphine alone or in combination with naloxone)
prescribed to those suffering from addiction.342 While The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists recommends methadone
for treating pregnant women addicted to opiates, they also suggest
that drugs such as buprenorphine can play the same role.343 While
available by prescription, Suboxone is also often available from
illegal sources.344
In the course of the conversation with her care provider, Ms.
Thomas disclosed not only that she took Suboxone, but that she had
no prescription for that medication. If this particular infant’s
symptoms had arisen solely from the ingestion of prescription
narcotics, then there was no basis for prosecution,345 a fact at least
potentially within the knowledge of this care provider. This leads
inevitably to the question of why questions about the source of her
Suboxone were asked. Did the provider have a medical basis for
asking this clearly legally important question? Perhaps s/he asked
it because s/he was required by CAPTA to disclose to child welfare
officials infants, “born with and identified as being affected by sub-
stance abuse.”346 Perhaps s/he had slipped roles from healthcare
provider to investigator for child welfare, the police and prosecu-
tion?347 In these subtle and, perhaps, not so subtle ways, the role of
342. NAT’L CTR. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., supra note 156, at 75.
343. See AM. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, supra note 189, at 4.
344. See Kate King, Lacking Treatment Options, Opioid Addicts Turn to Black Market,
WALL ST. J. (June 22, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lacking-treatment-
options-opioid-addicts-turn-to-black-market-1498132803 [https://perma.cc/G34A-QLB5].
345. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107(c)(2) (2018) (“Nothing in this section shall preclude
prosecution of a woman for assualt under § 39-13-101 for the illegal use of a narcotic drug ...
while pregnant.” (emphasis added)).
346. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (emphasis added). 
347. There is another plausible explanation for this line of inquiry. In 2013, Tennessee
began requiring hospitals to report cases of NAS. Warren et al., supra note 193, at 125. As
part of this reporting, the hospital must report the source of exposure, which includes
reporting whether the exposure was as a result of legally prescribed or off-prescription use.
TENN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE NEONATAL ABSTINENCE SYNDROME
(NAS) REPORTING SYSTEM (2012), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/health/documents/nas/
NAS_ReportingQuickReferenceGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KGV-D63Y]. That particular
reporting requirement, however, is anonymous in the sense that no names or demographic
information about the mothers or infants is provided to the Department. See id.
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healthcare providers in these hospitals settings played a significant
role in prosecutions and, at least arguably, undermined trust need-
ed between patient and care provider that is so essential to high
quality care.
2. The Relationship Between Prosecution and Care
As detailed above, a central justification for passage of the law
was that it would provide an incentive for women to seek treatment
and a set of mechanisms to ensure that it would be available to
them. With respect to accessing treatment as part of their criminal
cases, these women fall into four basic categories. The cases of six
women were dismissed in court for a variety of reasons, including
that there was no allegation and presumably no evidence that those
women had actually consumed narcotics during their pregnancies
or that they “did not meet the statute” for some other reason.348 The
remaining thirty-five women pled guilty to the charge and received
a variety of dispositions in their cases. As to accessing treatment,
the files of two of the women indicate that they were mandated to
complete some form of alcohol and drug assessment as part of their
mandatory probation. These two court files tell us nothing about
whether that assessment was done or what happened as a result of
it. Twelve other women were in fact mandated to go to some level of
treatment, such as Sarah Hunter, who was mandated to go to “90
meetings in 90 days,” and others who were clearly sent to inpatient
facilities for some period of time as a part of their sentence. For the
other twenty-one women, despite having pled guilty, there is no
evidence in their files that treatment was offered or provided.
For the twelve women who were given some access to treatment
in the course of their criminal case, the level of detail in the files
varies significantly, from a simple notation that the defendant was
to complete or was referred to a particular program, to extensive
details cataloguing the various stages of her case. For the purposes
of painting the picture of the interactions between criminal
prosecution and treatment, I recount below, in a good deal of detail,
348. For example, the affidavits of complaint in two of the cases assert only that the women
tested positive for THC, which is evidence of marijuana usage but not evidence of the usage
of narcotics.
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the facts that the General Sessions Court file reveals about five
cases. The first two cases are those of Maria Walsh and Vanessa
Thomas.
3. Accessing Treatment at a Cost: The Cases of Maria 
Walsh and Vanessa Thomas
Ms. Walsh, like the rest of the defendants, gave birth to an infant
with various health problems associated with opiate exposure. The
affidavit of complaint charging her with fetal assault details the
problems associated with her labor, the symptoms of her infant, and
the results of various drug tests performed in the hospital.
Ms. Walsh gave birth in March of 2015, and was charged with
fetal assault and arrested four months later. Bail was set at
$10,000. She appears to have made bail because she was subse-
quently charged with another offense—the failure to appear at a
court date. The court file, provided by the court for this research,
contains no record of the scheduling of this court date nor any
notification to her that there was in fact a court date. Nevertheless,
by the time she pled guilty in late July, she pled to both charges and
received two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-
nine days suspended to probation. The court imposed probation fees
of $100, presumably per month and court costs “as set.” She was
required to pay $50 per month toward these expenses. At that time,
the judgment contemplated that she would be on probation four
days short of two years, which, at a cost of $100 per month, would
result in the imposition of $2,400 in probation fees, as well as other
court costs. Clearly, all parties assumed that there was some chance
that this indigent defendant would not be able to pay all these
payments, because there is a notation on the judgment indicating
that “[d]efendant agrees to extend probation [beyond the two years]
until P.I.F.” This particular notation appears in the judgments for
every defendant in that particular county. Upon inquiry, court staff
informed me that P.I.F stands for “paid in full.”
Eight months later, Ms. Walsh was charged with a violation of
probation issues for two offenses, the failure to “pay monetary
obligations,” which, at that point, totaled $618.50 and a failure to
appear in court, “as required by the terms of [her] probation to
explain any reasons for his/her failure to comply with other
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probation requirements.” Her cost sheet indicates that, between the
initiation of charges and the violation of probation, she had
managed to pay only $40.00.
On this violation, Ms. Walsh was ordered held without bond.
After one month in jail, she pled guilty, her probation was revoked,
and she was ordered to serve two years in prison. It was only at this
point that there was any indication of an offer of treatment. The
judgment on that day stated, “after serving 9 months in jail, the
Court agrees to allow the defendant to enter and complete long-term
rehab, as approved by the Court.” As to the issue of her costs, in a
decision rare among the files, Ms. Walsh was also “declared indigent
as to cost in this case.”
The case of Vanessa Thomas, the woman who told hospital
personnel that she had obtained Suboxone illegally, is—like Ms.
Walsh’s case—emblematic of several in the sample in which women
were, in fact, given access to treatment, but that treatment came at
a tremendously high risk of sanctions for the failure to comply and
at a high monetary cost. At the time of her prosecution for fetal
assault, Ms. Thomas was already on probation for simple possession
of a controlled substance and child abuse. She had pled guilty to
those charges the year prior to her pregnancy and was in the midst
of serving two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-
nine days each on probation. Any violation of that probation could
result in the reinstatement of her almost two-year jail term. In this
sense, she was already known to the criminal system. And, because
she was already on probation, a condition of that probation was not
to commit additional crimes. In addition, in her original case, Ms.
Thomas had been ordered to pay several hundred dollars in court
costs, and she had not kept up with her payments. At the time of
her child’s birth, Ms. Thomas was then facing sanction not only for
fetal assault but for two separate instances of violation of proba-
tion—the failure to pay costs and the failure to desist from criminal
activity. This set of circumstances would significantly impact the
trajectory of her case and would make the consequences of any
failure to comply with court orders very steep.
Ms. Thomas gave birth to her child on January 3, 2015. An arrest
warrant was issued twelve days later, on January 15, and she was
arrested and taken to jail on that day. No bail was set, so, presum-
ably, Ms. Thomas remained in jail until her case was resolved. A
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judge at that point made a determination that Ms. Thomas was
indigent and appointed a public defender to represent her. Given
that determination, it is not clear why the court expected her to be
able to pay the various costs associated with her case, but neverthe-
less, these fees continued to accrue throughout her case.
Ms. Thomas’s fetal assault case would not be resolved for nearly
two more months, during which time she presumably sat in jail.
Between the fetal assault charge and her ultimate plea on March
17, 2015, the state filed two separate allegations of violation of
probation—one for a failure to pay and one for having committed
the crime of fetal assault while on probation. Though her original
court costs had originally been lower, by mid-March, they were up
to $1,701.75, and she had made little progress in paying them. She
also found herself facing the potential of significant jail time. If her
probation on the original charges was revoked, the judge could do a
variety of things, including continuing probation, imposing some jail
time followed by more probation, or imposing the original jail
sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days.349 In addition, a
finding of guilty of the fetal assault charge could result in another
eleven month and twenty-nine day sentence for that charge or a
total of almost two years in prison.350 So, going into court on March
17, 2015, Ms. Thomas faced serious risks of incarceration.
On that day, Ms. Thomas did plead guilty, and she was sentenced
to a year in prison—six months for the violation of probation and
another six months for the fetal assault charge. Though the judge
imposed this jail time, he suspended her jail sentence so that she
could go to inpatient treatment. Ms. Thomas went to jail and waited
for a treatment bed. It was not until June 16, three months later,
that a bed became available. During that three-month period, Ms.
Thomas had a constitutional right to receive healthcare,351 but, giv-
en the paucity of funding and widespread allegations that care is
349. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-311(e)(1).
350. This potential sentence would be reduced by any days Ms. Thomas had already served,
before various hearings and trials, in jail. For example, if she was sentenced to two eleven
month and twenty-nine day consecutive sentences but had already been in jail before various
court proceedings for twenty-two days, she would serve the full sentence minus twenty-two
days.
351. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976).
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not in fact provided, there is little reason to be confident that she
received any addiction care in jail.
It is hard to tell what happened with the treatment bed, but, on
October 2, 2015, there was a new violation of probation filed, al-
leging two violations—that she had failed to appear for her long-
term treatment and that she had failed to make any progress on her
court costs. She got arrested two months later, on December 21,
2015. On January 25, 2016, she was ordered to serve 180 days and
then was again placed on probation, “until compliance.” Presum-
ably, this order was focused on compliance with the order to pay
costs. By 2016, Ms. Thomas’s costs on the fetal assault charge, as
well as the various violations of probation, totaled $4,478.25. Her
cost bill, like all the cost bills in the sample, included a wide range
of charges. For example, on one of the violations of probation, for
which she owed a total of $3,827.75, she owed sixteen different
categories of fees:
Fee Amount
State Criminal Fee $2.00
State Cic $26.50
Attorneys Reim Tax $2.75
Fingerprint Tax $1.00
Victim Notification Fund $3.00
Judicial Comm. Tax $2.00
Officers Cost—County $40.00
County Litigation Tax $37.50
Courthouse Building Fund $2.00
Library Fund $1.00
Data Entry Gen. Sess. $4.00
Clerk Fee Gen. Sess. $62.00
Jail Fees-Other $3,600.00




Several items are of note in this cost sheet. First, note the number
of parts of the system that are funded, at least in part, through the
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imposition of small fees charged to criminal defendants. Everything
from the prison library to the taking of fingerprints is paid for, at
least in part, by the defendants themselves. A second thing to note
is the $3,600 charge for her jailing. The practice of charging defen-
dants for costs associated with their jailing is quite widespread.
The data above was run and provided to me on December 29,
2016, nearly a year after the last event in Ms. Thomas’s case. At
that point, she had not made any payments. And unlike Ms. Walsh,
who was lucky enough to have gotten a decision from the judge
declaring her indigent and therefore waiving her costs, Ms. Thomas
was not so lucky. The court had the authority to hold open her
probation until she fully paid these costs as well as the costs
associated with her other charges. Given Ms. Thomas’s indigency,
it seems likely that she, like so many around the country, embroiled
in the cost and fee structures of lower criminal courts,352 will remain
under supervision and subject to potential sanction because of those
costs.
These two cases are emblematic of those of several women in the
study in the relationship between punishment and care. In Ms.
Walsh’s case, there was an indication that after nine months in jail
as punishment for fetal assault, missing court dates, and failing to
pay costs, she might get a treatment bed. For Ms. Thomas, she did
eventually receive an offer of in-patient treatment. We do not know
what happened, but there is at least an allegation that she did not
take advantage of that resource. So in this sense, perhaps the
legislation was working as it was designed to work; the prosecution,
threats of jail, and imposition of high fees served as a “velvet ham-
mer” that might have coerced these two women into getting the help
they needed.353 But these cases also make clear that these offers of
treatment—for this particular population of low-income white wom-
en giving birth to infants with NAS—came at a high risk, a high
punitive price, and at the risk of potentially unending possibilities
of punishment by the criminal system.
352. See EDELMAN, supra note 42, at 7.
353. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
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4. Criminal Prosecution Despite Engagement in Treatment: 
The Case of Lacy Wilder
The case of Lacy Wilder represents a different set of circum-
stances regarding the relationship between prosecution and access
to treatment. Ms. Wilder, like Ms. Thomas, is white and low-income.
Also like Ms. Thomas, at the time she gave birth to her child Ms.
Wilder was already on probation, subjecting her to potential pun-
ishment not just for the fetal assault, but also for violating her
probation by committing a new crime. In 2012, approximately two
years prior to the birth of her child, Ms. Wilder had pled guilty to
promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony.354
At that time, the court imposed a three-year jail sentence, but
suspended that sentence to supervised probation.
As was the case for Ms. Thomas, any violation could lead to
revocation of probation and imposition of that three-year jail term.
At the time Ms. Wilder pled guilty to that felony, she owed a balance
of $8,803.00 in fees. Two years later, in April of 2014, a violation of
probation was filed in her case, alleging, among other things, that
she failed a drug test. A warrant issued; bond was set at $50,000,
but she was not arrested at that time. It was not until January of
2015 that these charges were resolved. At that point, Ms. Wilder
pled guilty to the violation of probation, her probation was rein-
stated, and the court extended supervision another six months.
Before that plea, though, in July of 2014, Ms. Wilder gave birth
in a toilet in her home. Her court file revealed that she admitted to
someone (it is not clear who) that she had used methamphetamines,
opiates, and subutex during her pregnancy. The prosecution was
clearly already aware that she had used drugs during her pregnan-
cy because they had charged her, three months earlier, with vio-
lating probation by failing a drug test and had added six months to
her sentence for that violation. Despite this, the prosecution
engaged in the fairly common practice of adding any and all
additional possible charges. So, in January of 2015, the state
brought the new fetal assault charge. In December of 2014, she was
arrested on the assault charge and, two months later, in March of
2015, she was again charged with violation of probation. This time,
354. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-17-433(f) (2018).
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the allegation was that she had violated probation by engaging in
criminal activity: the fetal assault itself.
Now, because of these two new charges, she was again facing a
potential reinstatement of her now three-and-a-half year jail sen-
tence as well as a jail sentence of up to eleven months and twenty-
nine days for the fetal assault itself. In August of that year she
again pled guilty, this time to an additional year of probation.
Although Ms. Wilder’s story is similar to Ms. Thomas’s in the
trajectory of a woman already on probation in the system, her treat-
ment story is quite different. Her court file revealed that within
weeks of giving birth both Ms. Wilder and the father of the child
voluntarily entered an outpatient treatment program. This appar-
ently went well enough that the Department of Children’s Services
voluntarily returned the child to Ms. Wilder’s home, an indication
that the agency had concluded that Ms. Wilder was addressing her
addiction issues and that her child was safe in her care. This set of
decisions, by Ms. Wilder to enter treatment and by DCS to allow her
to parent, did not end the prosecution. As described above, the state
proceeded, leaving her on probation and subject both to continued
supervision and, at that point, to nearly $9,000 in costs and fees on
her felony case and an additional $415.50 in costs on her fetal
assault case.
5. Criminal Prosecution Without Treatment: The Cases of
Margaret Swann and Bailey Johnson
Although the cases of Ms. Walsh, Ms. Thomas, and Ms. Wilder
tell a story of treatment associated to some degree with the criminal
case, in twenty-one of the thirty-six cases in which women pled
guilty, there is no indication in the files that treatment was offered
or required during the case.355 These cases play out, to a large
extent, in ways that mirror misdemeanor prosecutions in general,
with the imposition of probation along with fees that must be paid
355. Before proceeding, it is important to note the limitations of this data. The fact that the
criminal case files do not show an offer of or requirement of treatment does not mean that
these women may not have been offered treatment by actors within either the child welfare
or the criminal legal systems. It does, however, indicate that offering and/or requiring
treatment was not central to the disposition of the case.
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prior to the closure of the case and the end of probation.356 The cases
of Margaret Swann and Bailey Johnson, both of whom are also low-
income and white, are emblematic of these cases.
In June of 2015, Ms. Swann gave birth to a child who was,
according to the file, born with withdrawal symptoms. A month and
a half later, Ms. Swann was charged with fetal assault, a warrant
issued for her arrest, and bail was set at $10,000. She was arrested
about two weeks later, stayed in jail until her court date and, on the
day of court, pled guilty. She was sentenced to eleven months and
twenty-nine days in jail suspended to probation and she was
ordered to pay $75.00 a month toward her costs and toward the fee
for her probation. A month later, she paid her costs in full and nine
months later, having not been accused of violating her probation,
her case was closed. There was no indication in her file that she was
offered or had access to treatment as a result of the prosecution.
Unlike Ms. Swann, Ms. Johnson was not quite as compliant with
court requirements. She gave birth in June of 2015 and, like the
vast majority of defendants in the study, her court file contained
what would otherwise be protected medical information.357 Unlike
many of the other court files, but similar to the cases in this
particular jurisdiction, Ms. Johnson was charged with attempted
fetal assault rather than with fetal assault itself. This charge
carried half the maximum penalty or five months and twenty-nine
days of incarceration.358 In late October 2016 she pled guilty to that
offense, was fined $25.00, and received the full sentence (five
months and twenty-nine days) suspended to probation. On that day,
she was given a cost statement totalling $810.50 and was ordered
356. See supra Part III.C.3 (discussing misdemeanor prosecutions in Tennessee General
Sessions Court).
357. One interesting aspect of Ms. Johnson’s case, which is mirrored in prosecutions across
the state, involves the drug she is charged with ingesting during pregnancy. Ms. Johnson’s
affidavit of complaint alleges that her infant tested positive for cocaine. As discussed above,
the fetal assault law was framed as a response to NAS, which is a condition that results from
neonatal exposure to opiates, not cocaine. See Witt et al., supra note 141, at 1124. Never-
theless, the statute contemplated exposure to “narcotics,” which in Tennessee are defined by
statute to include cocaine. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-402(17)(D).
358. In Tennessee, a criminal attempt is classified as “one ... classification lower than the
most serious crime attempted.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-107. In this case, fetal assault is
classified as a class A misdemeanor, so the attempt was classified as a class B misdemeanor.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text. The maximum penalty for a class B misdemeanor
in Tennessee is five months and twenty-nine days. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-111(e)(2).
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to pay $10.00 per month toward those costs. In a notation echoed in
other files, this cost statement says that, “Per New Tennessee Law,
if not paid in full within one year of plea, license will be revoked
without notice.”
After sentencing, Ms. Johnson was assigned to serve her proba-
tion with the Correctional Counseling Institute, a local private
probation company under contract with the court. Four months
later, there was a report that she missed an appointment. A letter
was sent scheduling an additional appointment and she did not
appear. A bench warrant issued for Ms. Johnson’s arrest to “answer
to the charge of FTR 14 days in jail.” Presumably, FTR was short-
hand for failure to report, and, according to the court note on the
warrant, she had to serve fourteen days in jail as a result of the
allegation. She was arrested in early July and appeared in court
eight days later. She was then ordered to serve thirty days in jail.
By that time, her costs included not only the $810.50 on the original
charge, but an additional $1,032 on the violation of probation, for a
total of $1,842.50. Unlike Ms. Swann, who somehow gathered the
resources to buy her way out of supervision and punishment, Ms.
Johnson would remain under supervision and the threat of addi-
tional incarceration until those, and any additional costs imposed as
a result of continued supervision, were paid. For her, and for many
others subject to those conditions, escape seemed nearly impossible.
IV. THE ROAD FORWARD
This Article began by centering the idea, deeply embedded in the
justifications for passage of Tennessee’s fetal assault law, that it is
appropriate not only to provide care to those who find themselves
subject to the criminal legal system, but that this system of care is
so valuable that it made sense to create an entirely new crime just
to get those care resources to addicted women in Tennessee. This
logic went beyond the original justifications offered for today’s
version of problem-solving courts.359 The original justifications ar-
gued that, because defendants in court had care needs that were not
being addressed elsewhere, the courts should transform.360 The state
359. See supra Part I.B.
360. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Miller, supra note 63, at 420-23.
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should reframe its mission and add care resources to its structures
to address the needs of those who are already there.361 But Tennes-
see’s logic goes beyond this. Proponents argued, explicitly, that
courts were so good at solving these problems that it made sense to
create a crime just to create the possibility that women could receive
care.362
As this Article has shown, however, at least for the women in
East Tennessee, this promise was unfilled. For the majority of
women, there is no evidence in the criminal court files that care was
prioritized in their criminal case.363 For the minority to whom it was
offered, that offer was accompanied by the risk of extraordinary
punishment in the form of jail and fines.364 As scholars critical of
problem-solving courts have long argued, when you collapse care
into a system designed primarily to punish, punishment ultimately
prevails.365 There are several lessons to be drawn from this data.
First, while not central to the questions of care at the heart of this
Article, these cases provide a particularly poignant example of the
profound absurdity and cruelty of funding criminal legal systems on
the backs of poor defendants. Every woman discussed in this Article,
and likely every woman who was prosecuted, was indigent. Despite
their indigence, the fees piled up.366 Some, such as Ms. Swann,
found a way to pay them, and one, Ms. Walsh, had her fees waived,
but many did not.367 The seemingly prosaic notation in several court
files that, “[d]efendant agrees to extend probation until P.I.F.,” and
the preprinted notation on many of the plea agreements that,
pursuant to Tennessee law, defendants who fail to pay fees will lose
their drivers’ licenses,368 are stark evidence of the enormous
economic pressure placed on poor people finding themselves subject
to these systems. As was the case for many of the poor women,
escaping this system in the face of this pressure was almost
impossible. And failing to comply leads inevitably to more fees and
361. See Miriam Steele et al., Identifying Therapeutic Action in an Attachment-Centered
Intervention with High Risk Families, 38 CLINICAL SOC. WORK J. 61, 71 (2010).
362. See Hearing on S.B. 1391 Before S. Judiciary Comm. (I), supra note 5.
363. See supra Part III.D.3.
364. See supra Part III.D.3.
365. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
366. See generally Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 213, at 310-11.
367. See supra Part III.D.
368. But see Thomas v. Haslam, 303 F. Supp. 3d 585, 598 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).
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more jail time.369 National attention on this issue began in earnest
with the publication of the Obama Administration’s report on the
policing, prosecution, and court systems in Ferguson, Missouri370
and has continued with the publications of Peter Edelman’s book,
Not a Crime to Be Poor.371 It is essential that advocacy efforts to
eliminate that funding system continue.
Second, and returning to the broader framework of this Article,
this case study indicates that the trajectory of the criminalization
of poverty and, more specifically, the collapse of notions of social
support (or care) into punitive systems, continues apace. Though
this is a specific example, others, such as the interlocked social
welfare, child welfare, and criminal systems I described in The
Hyperregulatory State,372 the healthcare system described by
Bridges,373 the targeting of Section 8 recipients by multiple state
systems described by Ocen,374 and the intersections between child
welfare and prison systems described by Roberts,375 are similar in
the means by which criminal systems (and criminal system logic)
has moved into the social welfare arena and distorted central
notions of care that should be at the heart of our social welfare
system.376
So perhaps instead of remaining locked in that historical
trajectory, one can read this case study to suggest that we have
traveled too far down that road. Instead we must think about ways
to rebuild care systems in poor communities separate from the more
punitive arms of the state. Moving in this direction involves a series
of steps. First, the prosecutions described in this Article arose out
369. See supra Part III.D.3.
370. U.S. DEP’T JUST., C.R. DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DE-
PARTMENT, (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attach
ments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8PL-58PJ]; see
also Conor Friedersdorf, Ferguson's Conspiracy Against Black Citizens, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5,
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/03/ferguson-as-a-criminal-conspir
acy-against-its-black-residents-michael-brown-department-of-justice-report/386887/ [https://
perma.cc/2BKX-5AUV] (drawing attention to the high use of fees for minor violations by state
officials).
371. See EDELMAN, supra note 42.
372. See Bach, supra note 34.
373. See BRIDGES, supra note 47.
374. See Ocen, supra note 58.
375. See ROBERTS, supra note 53.
376. See supra Part I.
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of systemic collaborations between healthcare, child welfare, and
criminal legal system actors.377 But for those collaborations, the
prosecutions could not have taken place. One place to start is to
create more structural boundaries between these systems. One can
think about this specifically, in terms of the systemic intersections
highlighted in this case study, or more broadly, at a wide variety of
other systemic intersections giving rise to other ways poverty is
prosecuted and care is criminalized. Second, we must draw re-
sources away from punitive agencies and into care systems that
function separately from child welfare and criminal systems. These
care systems have to function both at the individual and family level
and at the community level. And crucially, these systems must be
designed with the active participation of members of those commu-
nities.
A. Intervening in the Systems at the Heart of the Case Study
The case files reveal the deep collaboration and information
sharing between actors in the healthcare, child welfare, and
criminal systems that laid the groundwork for these prosecutions.378
One path to reform is to take a careful look at the rules and
practices that gave rise to these collaborations.
1. The Healthcare System
As discussed in detail above, the prosecutions highlighted in this
Article relied, to a remarkable extent, on information gathered in
the healthcare setting.379 Blood test results, statements to care
providers, clinical observations, and diagnoses, as well as extensive
lab reports were all present in the court files. All this information,
once presumed confidential, found its way into public records and
into the hands of those who sought not to provide care, but to
prosecute and punish. As detailed above, generally speaking, these
disclosures were likely authorized by the various legal rules con-
cerning child abuse reporting.380 The case study, however, raises
377. See supra Part III.D.1.
378. See supra Part III.D.1.
379. See supra Part III.C.
380. See supra Part III.C.
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questions about whether we have struck the proper balance in these
legal rules. As discussed above, CAPTA requires disclosure to child
welfare officials upon evidence that an infant was “born with and ...
affected by substance abuse.”381 Moreover, this requirement is laid
on top of preexisting state requirements to report suspected cases
of abuse.382 This requirement pressures healthcare providers to
focus not on the provision of care, but on the gathering of evidence
for child welfare and prosecution agencies. In light of the preexist-
ing requirement to report abuse, perhaps CAPTA’s requirements go
too far.383
In the context of existing CAPTA requirements, the data in this
paper suggests that the healthcare field, and the legal systems that
govern it, have a responsibility to define for themselves what con-
stitutes an infant “affected by substance abuse.”384 Is the presence
of drugs in the infant or mother’s system alone enough to require a
report? States vary on how they answer this question and the in-
formation about these prosecutions might suggest a more conser-
vative approach to reporting.385
However, this case study suggests that a larger reckoning by
healthcare providers is in order. There is every reason to fear that
this case study is emblematic of larger trends in healthcare for poor
people in the U.S. The women’s data here was shared so easily and
so extensively that it is hard believe that this is not common
practice. Serious inquiry is in order about the ways in which
interactions between medical personnel and child welfare and
criminal system actors distort the provision of care and likely
violate medical ethics principles.386
381. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
382. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403(a)(1) (2018).
383. This CAPTA provision was added to the federal statute in 2003. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). Shortly thereafter, Ellen M. Weber argued that the burden placed
on healthcare providers to discover and report illegal conduct would distort their care role.
See Ellen Weber, Child Welfare Interventions for Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women:
Limitations of a Non-Public Health Response, 75 UMKC L. REV. 789, 839 (2007).
384. 42 U.S.C. § 5105a(b)(2)(B)(ii).
385. See Bach, supra note 34, at 349-51.
386. For important work along these lines, see, for example, George J. Barry & Diane L.
Redleaf, Medical Ethics Concerns in Physical Child Abuse Investigations: A Critical Per-
spective, FAM. DEF. CTR. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://www.familydefensecenter.net/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/ Medical-Ethics-Concerns-in-Physical-Child-Abuse-Investigations-corrected-
reposted.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4Z8-B89Q].
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2. The Child Welfare System
Just as this case study raises serious questions about how the
criminalization of care distorted healthcare, so too does it raise
serious questions about the wisdom of easy and automatic collabora-
tion between child welfare and criminal system actors. One of the
most striking pieces of policy at the center of these cases is the
decision in Tennessee to classify drug exposure as “severe abuse”
subject to procedures that draw police and prosecution into the case
of every woman who gives birth to a drug-exposed infant.387 And it
is important to note that, while the criminal law classifying this
conduct as fetal assault is no longer in effect, the classification of
drug-exposure as severe abuse remains.388 That decision is, in effect,
a determination that women addicted to drugs while pregnant are
analogous to those who commit sexual abuse and those whose
actions result in the death or near-death of children.
The significant lack of data on the long-term harms of drug-
exposure when contrasted with the enormous harms associated with
sexual and severe physical abuse certainly calls this analogy into
question.389 But beyond this, the designation raises questions about
whether the asserted purpose of the child welfare system, like the
healthcare system, is being distorted. Although one can certainly
question whether the child welfare system is the appropriate entity
to respond, it is clear that the child welfare system and the criminal
system have different purposes.
Child welfare systems are in place primarily to protect children
and are required, in all but a few circumstances, to make reasonable
efforts to maintain a child in the home.390 In the vast majority of
circumstances they must provide services to mothers to help them
achieve reunification.391 The goal is not punishment, but support.
But when the system conceptualizes a case, from the very start, as
one in which criminal intervention is appropriate, we are already
talking about punishment. On the micro level, one way to address
the harms described in this Article is to reform this state-level
387. See supra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
388. See In re B.A.C., 317 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); see also supra note 287.
389. See Bandstra et al., supra note 11, at 246.
390. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-166(a) (2018).
391. See id. § 37-1-166(c)(3).
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policy. But on a broader level, we as a nation need to take a very
careful look at collaborations between child welfare, police, and
prosecutors. These collaborations are certainly appropriate in some
cases, but they undermine the notions of support that should be at
the heart of child welfare policy. As a result, they merit careful
scrutiny.
3. The Criminal Legal System
As noted above, this case study demonstrates that, in its domi-
nant form,392 the criminal legal system is not tremendously good at
providing care.393 This calls into question the true purpose of crim-
inalizing in-utero drug transmission. Although this Article has fo-
cused on the care rationales behind the law, it has also strongly
focused on punishment. For the women who are the focus of this
study, the criminal legal system turned out to be very good at
punishment.394 The first and most obvious lesson one can draw from
this is that we need to be very honest about the rationales and
functions of crime creation and prosecution. In their functioning,
these cases may well have been about punishment, incapacitation,
or deterrence, but they were not about the criminal legal system
prioritizing access to care.
Even for those women whose files indicate that they were, at
some point in their cases, offered an opportunity for care, it came at
a very high cost.395 For women such as Maria Walsh and Vanessa
Thomas, who were both indigent and who owed thousands of dollars
and had spent months in jail at the end of their cases,396 it is not
clear how anything that happened was designed to help them get
the care they needed to turn their lives around. It may have been
392. One potential answer to the failures demonstrated in this case study, which focused
on cases that went through traditional courts, is problem-solving courts and that, had the
cases actually gone through them, the results would have been different. Statewide, early
data collection in the study indicated that 17 of the 124 documented cases of women pros-
ecuted for fetal assault in Tennessee had their cases processed through the Memphis Drug
Court and that, while these women were offered treatment, many of them ultimately failed
the program and received jail sentences. Although data collection is not complete, this is the
only evidence to date of women accessing drug courts as a result of fetal assault prosecutions.
393. See supra Part III.D.
394. See supra Part III.D.
395. See supra Part III.D.3.
396. See supra Part III.D.3.
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more politically palatable for some to frame this legislation as a
benevolent force, but it turned out not to reflect reality. This case
study suggests that, rather than continuing to conceptualize the
criminal system as a place where defendants can get help, we
should instead return that system to its role in punishment and
deterrence, and turn to creating a better, community-based system
of care. To do that, though, we have to significantly reframe the
problem we are trying to address.
B. Reconceptualizing the Problem and Moving Towards Larger
Solutions
Part II of this Article framed the problem that this legislation was
responding to as stemming from the rise in rates of neonatal
abstinence syndrome.397 It summarized data showing the variation
in the severity of neonatal abstinence syndrome, the conflicting and
limited evidence concerning the long-term effects of in-utero opiate
exposure, and the difficulties of isolating these effects from other
variables such as lack of prenatal care, poor nutrition, stress,
violence, and postnatal parental drug use.398 In Tennessee, NAS was
framed as an epidemic to which the legislature felt compelled to
respond; the women were framed as the perpetrators of harm and
the prosecutions were framed as a means to solve the problem.399
But in conclusion and to envision a more comprehensive care
response, it is important begin by reframing the problem. We can
start by revisiting the last time we as a society reacted institution-
ally to in-utero drug exposure.
The focus on NAS exists in the long shadow of what researchers
now acknowledge as largely baseless cultural fears and stigma
associated with infants exposed to crack cocaine.400 Those infants
were strongly associated in the cultural imagination with poor
African American women and were labeled “crack babies.”401 This
gave rise to the first significant wave of prosecutions of poor,
disproportionately African American women for in-utero drug
397. See supra Part II.
398. See supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
399. See Dosani, supra note 200.
400. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 213, at 333.
401. See ALEXANDER, supra note 36, at 5, 51-52.
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transmission.402 Some social workers at the time predicted, “a lost
generation—kids with a host of learning and emotional deficits who
would overwhelm school systems and not be able to hold a job or
form meaningful relationships.”403
Today our understanding of these children is far more nuanced.
Although in-utero cocaine exposure has been shown to have some
moderate effects on various developmental and behavioral out-
comes404 and there are clear short-term effects in pregnancy,405 we
now know that we were largely misframing the problem. The
intellectual journey of Dr. Hallam Hurt, then chair of Neonatology
at the Albert Einstein Medical Center, is emblematic of this story.406
Dr. Hurt and her team conducted a twenty-five-year longitudinal
study comparing the development of infants exposed to crack
cocaine to similarly situated infants who were not exposed.407 Dr.
Hurt and her team followed 224 babies born between 1989 and
1992.408 Half had been exposed to cocaine in-utero and the other half
had not.409 All the infants were born near or at full term and were
from low-income, predominantly African American families.410 At
the initiation of this study, Philadelphia was experiencing a drug
epidemic similar to the opiate epidemic of today and policymakers
there were focusing, as we are today, on the effect of drug exposure
on infants.411 “[N]early one in six newborns at city hospitals had
mothers who tested positive for cocaine.”412
What Hurt and her team found was that, as the infants aged,
there were “no significant differences between the cocaine-exposed
children and the controls.”413 What they did find, however, was that
402. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 213, at 299-300, 310-11.
403. Susan FitzGerald, ‘Crack Baby’ Study Ends with Unexpected but Clear Result, PHILA.
INQUIRER (June 21, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/health/20130721__Crack_baby__study
_ends_with_unexpected_but_clear_result.html?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/98NN-BDQV].
404. See Barry M. Lester & Linda L. Lagasse, Children of Addicted Women, 29 J.
ADDICTIVE DISEASES 259, 264 (2010).
405. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
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both groups of poor children, those who had been exposed to cocaine
and those who had not, “lagged on developmental and intellectual
measures compared to the norm.”414 Similar results have been echo-
ed in other long-term and rigorous studies.415 These consistent
results throughout the many years of the study led Hurt and her
team to look at other factors that might be harming the develop-
ment of these children.416
They looked at a variety of environmental factors and found that
although “being raised in a nurturing home” led to better outcomes,
significant proportions of the children, by age seven, had been
exposed to significant violence including gunshots, witnessing a
shooting, and seeing a dead body.417 That exposure correlated with
increased signs of depression and anxiety.418 These findings echo
similar research that has firmly established that exposure to what
are termed “adverse childhood experiences” (or ACEs) has harmful
long-term physical and mental effects on children.419 At the end of
the nearly quarter century study of these children, Hurt framed her
conclusions succinctly: “Poverty is a more powerful influence on the
Betancourt et al., Adolescents with and Without Gestational Cocaine Exposure: Longitudinal
Analysis of Inhibitory Control, Memory and Receptive Language, 33 NEUROTOXICOLOGY &
TERATOLOGY 36 (2011) (finding no significant developmental differences between cocaine-
exposed children and controls); Hallam Hurt et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
and Working Memory in Adolescents with Gestational Cocaine Exposure, 152 J. PEDIATRICS
371 (2008); Hallam Hurt et al., A Prospective Evalution of Early Language Development in
Children with In-Utero Cocaine Exposure and in Control Subjects, 130 J. PEDIATRICS 310
(1997); Hallam Hurt et al., Children with In Utero Cocaine Exposure Do Not Differ from
Control Subjects on Intelligence Testing, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1237
(1997).
414. FitzGerald, supra note 403.
415. See, e.g., Josephine V. Brown et al., Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Comparison of 2-
Year-Old Children in Parental and Nonparental Care, 75 CHILD DEV. 1282 (2004); Rina D.
Eiden et al. Externalizing Behavior Problems Among Polydrug Cocaine-Exposed Children:
Indirect Pathways via Maternal Harshness and Self-Regulation in Early Childhood, 28
PSYCHOL. ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 139 (2014); Deborah A. Frank et al., Level of Prenatal Cocaine
Exposure and Scores on the Bayley Scales of Infant Development: Modifying Effects of
Caregiver, Early Intervention, and Birth Weight, 110 PEDIATRICS 1143 (2002); Deborah A.
Frank et al., Problematic Substance Use in Urban Adolescents: Role of Intrauterine Exposures
to Cocaine and Marijuana and Post-Natal Environment, 142 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE
181 (2014).
416. See FitzGerald, supra note 403.
417. See id.
418. See id.
419. See Anthony Biglan et al., Evolving a More Nurturing Society to Prevent Adverse
Childhood Experiences, 17 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 150 (2017).
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outcome of inner-city children than gestational exposure to co-
caine.”420 Ultimately, Hurt and her team turned their focus to the
effects of poverty on developmental growth and Hurt has since gone
on to focus her research on these crucial and complex issues.421
Perhaps this history, and some additional knowledge from
healthcare research, can teach us a lesson about how to reframe
both the problem and the solution. Rather than continuing to frame
the problem individually and punitively, as mothers’ potentially
criminal, abusive, or neglectful conduct that harms children, we can
instead frame it primarily in the context of the resources that
struggling parents (who often have experienced severe trauma in
their own lives) and struggling, under-resourced communities need
in order to heal and raise healthy children.
To get a sense of what this looks like in the context of addiction
and family-centered care, take, for example, a program in East
Tennessee: the Great Starts Program. The Great Starts Program is
a residential treatment program housing pregnant and parenting
women and their children together.422 The women in the Great
Starts Program have experienced, on average, 5.6 ACEs. The con-
cept of ACEs and their affect on health stems from a study, pub-
lished in 1998, in the American Journal of Preventative Medicine.423
ACEs include: “psychological, physical, or sexual abuse; emotional
or physical neglect; family dysfunctions including alcohol or drug
abuse in the home; divorce or loss of biological parent; depression or
mental illness in the home; the mother being treated violently; or a
household member being in prison.”424
The title of the ACEs study describes its dramatic findings:
Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to
Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults.425 The study
demonstrated a clear linkage between exposure to adverse experi-
ences and later physical health problems.426 Experiencing ACEs
420. FitzGerald, supra note 403.
421. See id.
422. Great Starts, HELEN ROSS MCNABB CTR., https://www.mcnabbcenter.org/service/great-
starts [https://perma.cc/KU7M-4XAV].
423. Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction
to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults, 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245 (1998).
424. Biglan et al., supra note 419, at 150.
425. Felitti, supra note 423.
426. See id. at 250.
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makes it significantly more likely that one will experience a wide
range of negative outcomes, and the more ACEs you experience, the
more likely this is.427 Negative outcomes can include things such as
chronic depression, suicide attempts, and anxiety disorders, as well
as “a significantly greater likelihood of premature death due to
physical illness.”428 ACEs are scored on a scale from one to seven.429
The higher the score the higher the number of adverse experiences
and the higher likelihood of harm.430 The average score at Great
Starts of 5.6 gives one a sense of the enormity of the task before the
women in achieving health. Their children are similarly “at risk of
early adversities and toxic stress including NAS, developmental de-
lays, abuse and neglect, and parental separation due to parental
incarceration and placement in out-of-home care.” The women are
also nearly all low-income,431 which means that they likely come
from vastly under-resourced communities lacking in safety and
basic community resources such as parks, safe streets, daycares,
and good schools.
The data coming from the ACE study is daunting. Even more
daunting is the knowledge that experiencing trauma as a child can
lead to intergenerational trauma. A child whose basic needs for
healthy parenting are not met is more likely to become a mother
who similarly cannot meet her child’s needs.432 But the very good
news is that this cycle can be interrupted. Important advances in
mental health treatment, such as the development of Child-Parent
Psychotherapy, have “been shown to be effective ... for families
whose risk context includes maternal depression, poverty, domestic
violence, mothers with trauma histories, and maltreated children
known to preventive services.”433
427. See Biglan, supra note 419, at 150.
428. See id.
429. Felitti, supra note 423, at 248.
430. See id. at 248, 250.
431. Interview with Great Starts staff member (transcript on file with author). It is
important to note that ACEs and their effects are not isolated to poor households. ACEs
overall, and some ACEs in particular, do occur at higher rates at the lower end of the income
spectrum, however, the damaging health effects ACEs occur throughout the income spectrum. 
432. See Steele et al., supra note 361, at 62-63, 65-66.
433. Id. at 62; see also ALICIA F. LIEBERMAN & PATRICIA VAN HORN, PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH
INFANTS AND YOUNG CHILDREN: REPAIRING THE EFFECTS OF STRESS AND TRAUMA ON EARLY
ATTACHMENT 64-65 (2010).
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Work like this, on the individual and family level, can provide the
support that women need, and this is precisely what is going on at
Great Starts. Great Starts offers what they call “a continuum of
family-focused services.”434 As they frame it, “[t]he overarching goal
is to prevent infants and small children from parental separation
and strengthen the parent-child bond through comprehensive
treatment services and specialized services for children.”435
And, as the larger research predicts, this is working at Great
Starts on an individual and family level. Eighty-seven percent of
children born while in the Great Starts program are not diagnosed
with NAS.436 Eighty-one percent spend no time in the NICU and 83
percent are born full term and at a healthy weight.437 The mothers
do well too. Eighty-seven percent are not using at exit; only 7 per-
cent lack health insurance on exit; 85 percent achieve housing
stability, and overall they demonstrate “improved well being as
measured by depression and trauma assessments ... an increase in
nurturing parenting skills and a decrease in parenting stress.”438
But in a region with astonishing rates of opiate abuse, this is the
only addiction treatment program in East Tennessee that houses
mothers with their children.439 They have spots for fourteen families
at a time.440 And, unsurprisingly, they too are, inevitably, part of the
criminalization of care. The vast majority of mothers in the program
are already involved in—and are often referred by—child welfare
and criminal justice agencies.441 Clearly we need much, much more
than a small model program, both in East Tennessee and in the
many regions hardest hit by the opiate epidemic.
But even if we had enough beds in clinics such as Great Starts,
we would only be focusing on the level of the individual family. For
the women and children who get this care, the communities to which
they return after being in the program often lack fundamental




438. Great Starts Program information and outcomes data on file with author.
439. Great Starts is in fact only one of two programs in the State of Tennessee that
provides this model of care. The other, Renewal House, is located in the middle of the state,
in Nashville. Interview with Great Starts staff member, supra note 431.
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supportive resources. One staff member at Great Starts clearly
framed this issue. For the 70 percent of women who complete the
program,
they’re happy, they’re sober, they are parenting, they’re bonding,
they’re reconnecting with family members that they haven’t
been with, they’re working their case plans with their families,
they’re working towards getting their children back. We’ve had
clients get their children back, and then unfortunately they go
into a community that is harsh.... It’s so sad when you see
families that are capable of doing well, given the proper support.
You know, you see them parenting beautifully, and living a
happy life, and getting a job, and yeah. It’s sad.442
This too is the focus of research. Although the original ACE
studies focused on individual adverse experiences, we know that
communities characterized by a lack of safety and supportive
resources can also undermine family health.443 The exposure of
young children to violence noted in Dr. Hurt’s work is emblematic
of these enormous community-based harms.444 In short, place
matters. “Place-based research and analysis has shown that poorer
neighborhoods are characterized by much less physical, economic,
educational, and social capital than more affluent ones.”445 As the
field of pediatrics is coming to understand,
[t]he more distressed a neighborhood, the more the daily toll of
seeking to get by and stay safe produces stress.... At some point,
there must not only be a focus upon individually based services
and supports for young children and their families, but for
community-building activities to support and strengthen the
community’s overall capacity to support its children.446
So we need to invest in resources to make communities safer and
more supportive. Investing in resources means, among many other
442. Id.
443. See Charles Bruner, ACE, Place, Race, and Poverty: Building Hope for Children, 17
ACAD. PEDIATRICS S123 (2017).
444. See FitzGerald, supra note 403.
445. Bruner, supra note 443, at 124.
446. Id. at 125.
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things, parks, good schools, opportunities for interaction, and safe
streets. Finally, it is clear that solutions cannot be imposed on com-
munities from the outside. Instead, solutions that are generated
from impacted communities themselves often offer the most hope.447
In 2013, the Tennessee legislature attempted to respond to
astonishingly high rates of opiate addiction and the effect of that
addiction epidemic on children. In 2016 attempts to make the law
permanent failed, seemingly relegating this particular experiment
to history. Sadly, however, just at this Article was going to press,
Tennessee’s fetal assault law was reintroduced in the state house
and senate,448 leading to the distinct possibility that the harms
described in this Article will be repeated in the years to come.
Tennessee legislators were certainly right then, and they are right
today, that there is a serious addiction crisis in the state. The epi-
demic is devastating families and communities both in Tennessee
and well beyond. But we will never heal children by punishing their
mothers. Instead we have to turn away from criminalization and
recommit to a far more robust and respectful vision of care for
children, families and communities.
447. See PREVENTION INST., ADVERSE COMMUNITY EXPERIENCES AND RESILIENCE: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING AND PREVENTING COMMUNITY TRAUMA 17, 23-24 (2016). At the
conclusion of the From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, Elizabeth Hinton makes this
precise point. See HINTON, supra note 85, at 336-37. She marks the mid-1960s decision to
abandon the commitment to maximum feasible participation as the moment when we turned
away from supporting grassroots participation in the administration of federally funded
poverty programs and turned toward building the war on crime. Id.
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